



P.R.I.I.A. SECTION 226 GULF COAST SERVICE PLAN REPORT



July 16, 2009

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I. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

A. Background

Enacted into law on October 16, 2008, the Passenger Rail Investment and Improvement Act of 2008 (PRIIA) (Public Law 110-453) reauthorizes the nation's intercity passenger rail provider, Amtrak, and establishes new programs and policies to strengthen the U.S. intercity passenger rail system.

Section 226 of PRIIA requires Amtrak to develop, by July 16, 2009, a plan for restoring passenger rail service between New Orleans, Louisiana and Sanford, Florida. The plan is to include a projected timeline and projected costs, and identify any legislative changes required to support reinstatement of service.

The report fulfills the requirements of Section 226. It identifies the most feasible options for restoring service and their projected timelines and costs, and the need for legislative action to provide additional funding if one of the options is chosen. During the development of the report, Amtrak consulted with representatives from the states of Louisiana, Mississippi, Alabama and Florida; host railroad partners; rail passengers; rail labor representatives; and other entities, as appropriate and as specified by Section 226.

B. Service History

In 1993, Amtrak's *Sunset Limited*, which operated between Los Angeles, California and New Orleans, Louisiana, was extended east from New Orleans to Jacksonville, Orlando, and initially to Miami, Florida. This created a new transcontinental Amtrak route and brought passenger rail service to the Gulf Coast Region between New Orleans and Jacksonville. In August 2005, *Sunset Limited* service east of New Orleans was suspended due to Hurricane Katrina, which caused massive damage to rail infrastructure on the portion of the train's route between New Orleans, Louisiana and Mobile, Alabama. The service remains suspended today because of the cost and challenges associated with restoring service to this route.

C. Route Map

The following map depicts the route of *Sunset Limited* at the time of its suspension, and the 19 train stations it formerly served between New Orleans and Orlando.



D. Operating Plan Overview

1. Suspended Service Stations

Amtrak's suspension of *Sunset Limited* service east of New Orleans at the time of Hurricane Katrina halted intercity passenger rail service at twelve stations not served by other Amtrak routes. A thirteenth station, the Sanford station in Central Florida, was removed from service in February 2005 due to damage from hurricanes preceding Hurricane Katrina. These 13 stations are referred to as the "Suspended Service Stations". In addition to Sanford, they are:

- Bay St. Louis, Mississippi
- Gulfport, Mississippi
- Biloxi, Mississippi
- Pascagoula, Mississippi
- Mobile, Alabama
- Atmore, Alabama
- Pensacola, Florida
- Crestview, Florida (Ft. Walton Beach)
- Chipley, Florida (Panama City)
- Tallahassee, Florida
- Madison, Florida
- Lake City, Florida

2. Preferred Options for Service Restoration

Amtrak initially evaluated 12 alternatives, described in more detail in Section IV of the report, for restoring service between New Orleans, and Florida. Of the 12 alternatives, three were selected as preferred options for evaluation in the study based upon projected ridership, revenue, operating costs, and operating loss.

The preferred options, which are depicted in the route map below, are:

- Option 1: Restore tri-weekly *Sunset Limited* service between Los Angeles, California and Orlando, Florida.
- Option 2: Extend the daily *City of New Orleans* service, which currently operates between Chicago, Illinois and New Orleans, Louisiana, east from New Orleans to Orlando, Florida.
- Option 3: Implement daily stand-alone overnight service between New Orleans, Louisiana and Orlando, Florida.



Each of the three proposed options would restore service between New Orleans and Orlando. This report assumes that all of the 19 stations between New Orleans and Orlando, including the 13 Suspended Service Stations, would be served by the restored service.

3. Preferred Options: Key Metrics

The table depicts the key projected financial and performance metrics, discussed below, for the three preferred options:

Projected Performance (dollar figures are in millions)	Option 1 (Tri-Weekly <i>Sunset Limited</i>)	Option 2 (Daily <i>City of New Orleans</i> Extension)	Option 3 (Daily Stand-Alone Train)
Capital/Mobilization Costs	\$32.7	\$57.6-\$96.6	\$57.6-\$96.6
Passenger Revenue	\$6.0	\$9.2	\$5.6
Direct Costs	\$10.8	\$20.9	\$24.0
Direct Operating Contribution/(Loss)	(\$4.8)	(\$11.7)	(\$18.4)
Farebox Recovery	56%	44%	23%
Annual Ridership	53,300	96,100	79,900
Passenger Miles/Train Mile	228	126	81

E. Capital Improvements and Mobilization Costs

Projected capital and mobilization costs for restored service are \$32.7 million for Option 1 (tri-weekly *Sunset Limited*) and \$57.6 million to \$96.6 million for both Option 2 (daily *City of New Orleans* extension) and Option 3 (daily stand-alone train). Capital/mobilization expenditures required for all three options are:

- \$10.7 million for restoring the 13 Suspended Service Stations to a state of good repair and bringing them into compliance with Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) requirements (including \$3.2 million for the demolition and reconstruction of the Sanford, Florida station);
- \$600,000 for improvements at Amtrak’s Sanford maintenance facility where equipment would be maintained;

- a preliminary estimate of \$20 million for Positive Train Control (PTC) costs as the Rail Safety Improvement Act of 2008 may require installation of PTC by 2015 on portions of the route solely because of the restoration of passenger service; and
- training and engineer/conductor qualification costs of \$1.4 million for Option 1 and \$2.3 million for Options 2 and 3.

For Options 2 and 3, additional equipment would be required to support this service. Each of these options is projected to require the acquisition of between six and 14 new passenger cars, at a cost of \$24 million to \$63 million.

These capital and mobilization cost estimates do not include expenditures, if any, required to increase rail line capacity. CSX Transportation, Inc., the host freight railroad that owns nearly all of the New Orleans - Orlando route, has indicated that it will seek significant capacity investments as a prerequisite to any service restoration. Contrary to this assertion, Amtrak does not believe that any infrastructure capacity investments on CSX are required to restore the formerly operated tri-weekly service (Option 1), and holds that the need for any track investments to support daily service, Options 2 and 3, should be determined through capacity modeling undertaken in collaboration with CSX.

F. Financial Performance

The projected annual direct operating loss associated with restoring service between New Orleans and Orlando is:

- \$ 4.8 million for Option 1 (restoration of tri-weekly *Sunset Limited*);
- \$11.7 million for Option 2 (daily *City of New Orleans* extension); and
- \$18.4 million for Option 3 (daily stand-alone train).

Projected farebox recovery – the percentage of direct operating costs covered by passenger revenues generated by restored service (including additional revenues on connecting routes) – is 56% for Option 1, 44% for Option 2, and 23% for Option 3.

G. Ridership Forecast

Ridership was a primary consideration in selecting the three preferred options. The projected additional Amtrak annual ridership associated with each is:

- 53,300 for Option 1 (restoration of tri-weekly *Sunset Limited*);
- 96,100 for Option 2 (daily *City of New Orleans* extension); and
- 79,900 for Option 3 (daily stand-alone train).

Projected additional passenger miles on the Amtrak route system (on both the restored service and other routes with which it would connect) for each train mile operated are:

- 228.3 passenger miles for Option 1;
- 125.9 passenger miles for Option 2; and
- 80.5 passenger miles for Option 3.

Option 1 produces the highest passenger miles per train mile because it attracts more passengers making longer trips (e.g., Los Angeles to Orlando). Potential ridership between New Orleans and Orlando is adversely impacted by the circuitry of the rail route (769 miles versus 639 miles by highway) and slow speeds that result in a rail trip time of 18.5 hours versus 9.6 hours by automobile.¹

H. Public Benefits

Assuming additional federal or state funding is provided, Amtrak anticipates that restoring passenger service between New Orleans and Orlando will produce modest net economic benefits. Direct benefits include the impact of the approximately \$11.3 million in station and facility capital investments along the route and the creation of between 32 and 122 permanent Amtrak jobs, depending upon which option is chosen. Such expenditures would create jobs, primarily in construction, manufacturing and material supply, for the duration of these projects. Operation of the service will also lead to expenditures for food, supplies, lodging for train crews, etc. that will benefit local economies, and can also be expected to produce significant ongoing spillover economic benefits. The daily service options – Options 2 and 3 – would require additional capital expenditures of \$24-\$63 million for new equipment. While construction of new equipment is likely to create domestic manufacturing jobs, these jobs are unlikely to be located in the Gulf Coast Region.

¹ Data from MapQuest Driving Directions

Restoration of passenger rail service between New Orleans and Orlando would also produce mobility benefits by creating a direct link between Florida, the Gulf Coast Region, and the Central and Western United States. Communities along the Gulf Coast, many of which have limited or no intercity public transportation service and continue to be affected by the devastation of Hurricane Katrina, would regain a passenger rail option.

Option 1, which generates the highest number of additional passenger miles per train mile, may produce some energy savings due to diversion of trips that would otherwise be taken by less energy efficient automobiles and airplanes. Options 2 and 3 are not likely to produce measurable environmental, energy or congestion relief benefits because they generate relatively few additional passenger miles per train mile operated and the distance by rail between many city pairs they would serve is considerably longer than the distance by air or highway.

I. Timeline

Implementation of Option 1 (restoration of tri-weekly *Sunset Limited*) would require a minimum of 20 months lead time from the date on which funding is made available. This is due to the time required to hire, train, and qualify locomotive engineers, and to bring stations into to a state of good repair and make them ADA compliant. Option 2 (daily *City of New Orleans* extension) and Option 3 (daily stand-alone train) would take approximately four years to implement, since purchase of new equipment would be required. These projections are subject to a number of contingencies.

J. Conclusion and Next Steps

This plan identifies the most viable options for restoring intercity passenger rail service between New Orleans, Louisiana and Orlando, Florida. Amtrak recommends that federal and state policymakers determine if passenger rail service should be restored between New Orleans and Orlando; and if so:

1. Identify the preferred option for service restoration; and
2. Provide the additional funding for capital and ongoing operating costs that will be required to implement that option.

Once these actions are taken, Amtrak will move quickly to initiate the steps required for service restoration, if such an option is chosen.

II. INTRODUCTION

A. Purpose of the Report

Enacted into law on October 16, 2008, the Passenger Rail Investment and Improvement Act of 2008 (PRIIA) (Public Law 110-453) reauthorizes the nation's intercity passenger rail provider, Amtrak. PRIIA seeks to strengthen the U.S. intercity passenger rail system through the development of new policies, the authorization of operating and capital support for Amtrak, and sustained capital investment through new federal grant programs, administered by the United States Department of Transportation (U.S. DOT) through the Federal Railroad Administration (FRA), that provide funding for passenger rail improvements.

Additionally, PRIIA requires Amtrak to undertake a number of studies and reports relating to various intercity passenger rail services. Section 226 of PRIIA requires Amtrak to develop a plan for restoring passenger rail service between New Orleans, Louisiana and Sanford, Florida. The plan is to include a projected timeline, projected costs, and any legislative changes needed to support restoration of service.

This report serves to fulfill the requirements of Section 226. It will be transmitted to the U.S. House of Representatives' Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure and the U.S. Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, as specified.

In order to prepare the report, Amtrak developed projections for ridership, revenues and operating and capital costs for 12 service alternatives for restoring service between New Orleans, Louisiana and Sanford/Orlando, Florida. Three preferred options were identified for further consideration. For each of these three options, the report includes a projected timeline and the estimated operating and capital costs associated with restoring service.² Finally, the report addresses the need for legislative action to provide the funding necessary to support restoration of service.

In developing the report, Amtrak consulted with representatives from the States of Louisiana, Mississippi, Alabama, and Florida, as required by PRIIA. Host railroads – CSX Transportation, Inc. (“CSX”) which owns nearly the entire route, and Norfolk Southern Railway (Norfolk Southern), which owns a short segment

² The projections of capital costs – particularly for Options 2 and 3 that would provide daily service over the route – are subject to a number of uncertainties that are identified in the report.

within New Orleans – were also contacted. In addition, Amtrak held a series of community outreach programs, soliciting input and comments from rail passengers, elected officials at key cities on the proposed route and members of the four states' Congressional delegations. This outreach effort is described in Sections VIII and IX.

B. Background and Historical Data

Before Amtrak began operations in 1971, passenger rail service over the New Orleans, Louisiana to Jacksonville, Florida route was provided by the Louisville and Nashville Railroad (L&N) and the Seaboard Coast Line Railroad, predecessors of CSX. The two railroads jointly operated an overnight New Orleans to Jacksonville train named the *Gulf Wind*. Along the portion of the route between New Orleans and Flomaton, Alabama, the *Gulf Wind* was combined with the L&N's *Pan American*, which operated between New Orleans, and Cincinnati, Ohio.

Amtrak's original route system, designated by U.S. DOT, did not include either the *Gulf Wind* or *Pan American* routes. As a result, passenger rail service between New Orleans and Jacksonville was discontinued on April 30, 1971.

In April of 1984, Amtrak began operating a daily round trip between Mobile, Alabama and New Orleans known as the *Gulf Coast Limited*. The service, which departed Mobile in the morning and returned each evening, was funded in part by the states of Louisiana, Mississippi and Alabama. The primary intent of the service was to facilitate travel to the Louisiana World Exposition in New Orleans. The train was discontinued in January 1985 after its state funding ended. A similar service, also known as the *Gulf Coast Limited* and funded by the same states, subsequently operated between Mobile and New Orleans from June 1996 to March 1997.

In April of 1993, Amtrak's tri-weekly *Sunset Limited*, operating between Los Angeles, California and New Orleans, was extended east from New Orleans to Miami, Florida, by way of Jacksonville and Orlando, Florida. The *Sunset Limited's* Florida terminus was shifted in November 1996 to Sanford, Florida, with connecting train service for passengers traveling to/from Orlando and Miami. Through service to Orlando was reinstated in October 1997.

Due to deteriorating on-time performance attributable primarily to freight train interference, the *Sunset Limited's* schedule between Jacksonville and New Orleans was lengthened in October 2000. However, on-time performance remained poor both east and west of New Orleans. In fiscal year 2004, the

train’s on-time performance dipped to 4.3 percent. As a result, in March 2005, the *Sunset Limited’s* schedule between New Orleans and Los Angeles was significantly lengthened. The cumulative effect of these changes as of August 2005 was that:

- scheduled running time between Orlando and New Orleans was one hour and 40 minutes longer westbound, and three hours longer eastbound, than it had been prior to 2000; and
- due to the schedule changes west of New Orleans, a number of key markets between Orlando and New Orleans were served at inconvenient times in one or both directions.

Despite these steps, the train’s on-time performance remained poor.

During August 2005, all Amtrak service to New Orleans was suspended as a result of Hurricane Katrina, which caused massive damage to rail infrastructure on the CSX rail line between New Orleans and Mobile. Freight service on the New Orleans-to-Mobile line was restored by CSX in 2006, but Amtrak’s *Sunset Limited* service east of New Orleans remains suspended.

The following table provides a brief chronological history of passenger rail service along the rail line between New Orleans and Florida:

Date Range	Event
Prior to 1971	Two railroads jointly operate the <i>Gulf Wind</i> between New Orleans and Jacksonville
May 1, 1971	New Orleans - Jacksonville route not included in initial Amtrak route network; service discontinued
1971 – 1984	No passenger rail service
April 1984 – January 1985	State-supported <i>Gulf Coast Limited</i> service operated between New Orleans and Mobile, Alabama
1985 – 1993	No passenger rail service
April 1993 – November 1996	<i>Sunset Limited</i> service extended from New Orleans to Jacksonville, Orlando, and Miami, creating transcontinental passenger rail route

June 1996 – March 1997	Second state-supported <i>Gulf Coast Limited</i> service operated between Mobile and New Orleans
November 1996 – October 1997	<i>Sunset Limited</i> operated from New Orleans to Sanford, Florida; service beyond Sanford to Miami discontinued
October 1997 – August 2005	<i>Sunset Limited</i> operated from New Orleans to Sanford extended to Orlando
August 2005	Rail line between New Orleans and Mobile damaged in Hurricane Katrina, and removed from service for both freight and passenger operations
August 2006 – Present	CSX restores freight service; passenger rail service remains suspended to date

C. Existing Railroad Infrastructure and Operational Characteristics

In order to provide a clear description of current rail infrastructure and operational characteristics of the 769-mile *Sunset Limited* route between New Orleans, Louisiana and Sanford/Orlando, Florida, the route has been divided into five segments that are described below. The “Suspended Service Stations” referenced in the description, which Amtrak does not presently serve, are discussed in Section III.

1. New Orleans Terminal Area

The first seven miles of the New Orleans – Orlando route, also used by Amtrak’s daily *Crescent* between New Orleans and New York, New York, are the only portion of the route that is not owned, maintained and dispatched by CSX.

The route begins at New Orleans Union Passenger Terminal (NOUPT). In addition to the *Crescent*, NOUPT is served by Amtrak’s *City of New Orleans* that operates daily between New Orleans and Chicago, Illinois, and the tri-weekly *Sunset Limited* between New Orleans and Los Angeles, California. Trains departing NOUPT proceed directly out of the station; arriving trains reverse direction by first heading around a wye and back into the station.

The 3.5 mile segment between NOUPT and East City Junction is leased to Amtrak and operated under Centralized Traffic Control (CTC). Under CTC, train operations are governed by a dispatcher at a

central location. The dispatcher controls the switches that permit movements between tracks and “controlled” passing sidings and the signals along the track that authorize trains to proceed. Between East City Junction and the New Orleans Terminal (N.O.T) Junction, trains operate over a 3.4-mile, double-track, Norfolk Southern line that is also equipped with CTC.

2. N.O.T Junction (New Orleans) to Flomaton, Alabama

At N.O.T Junction in northeastern New Orleans, the route joins the CSX-owned line that runs east to Jacksonville, Florida. The 196-mile segment between N.O.T Junction and Flomaton, Alabama is a CTC-equipped, primarily single track line with short stretches of double track. It also has 17 controlled passing sidings that allow trains traveling in opposite directions, or faster trains operating behind slower trains, to pass each other in single track territory. Maximum passenger train speeds are generally 60-79 miles per hour, although there are nearly a dozen 30 miles per hour speed restrictions on bridges and in terminal areas. The Suspended Service Stations within this segment are Bay St. Louis, Biloxi, Gulfport, and Pascagoula, Mississippi, and Mobile and Atmore, Alabama.

3. Flomaton, Alabama to Tallahassee, Florida

The 247-mile track segment between Flomaton and Tallahassee is non-signaled “dark” territory. In dark territory, train operations are not governed or protected by a signal system. Instead, the dispatcher issues train orders, generally via radio communications that are written down and repeated by the train crew, that authorize trains to operate between designated points on the line known as “block limits”. Under Federal Railroad Administration regulations, passenger trains operating in dark territory cannot exceed 59 miles per hour.

The line between Flomaton and Tallahassee has seven long and one short passing sidings. Maximum speeds are generally 40-59 miles per hour, but are limited to 20 miles per hour on a seven-mile section of track at CSX’s Chattahoochee Yard west of Tallahassee. This segment includes the Suspended Service Stations at Pensacola, Chipley, Crestview, and Tallahassee, Florida.

4. Tallahassee, Florida to Jacksonville, Florida

The 168-mile line between Tallahassee and Jacksonville is single track and CTC-equipped with 16 controlled passing sidings. This segment includes the Suspended Service Stations at Madison and Lake City, Florida, and ends at Amtrak's Jacksonville station. The last three miles from Beaver Street interlocking to the Jacksonville station are also used by Amtrak's *Silver Star* and *Silver Meteor* trains between the Northeast and Florida. A wye track located near the Jacksonville station was used to turn the *Sunset Limited*, which then backed into the station.

5. Jacksonville, Florida to Orlando, Florida

Leaving the Jacksonville station, the *Sunset Limited* – now heading south – followed the same three-mile segment back to Beaver Street interlocking, where the Orlando-bound train continued south to its destination. The 151-mile segment between Jacksonville and Orlando is CTC-equipped and primarily single track, with 12 controlled passing sidings and short segments of double track near Jacksonville and Orlando. Maximum speeds are 70-79 miles per hour over most of this segment, but vary between 25-60 miles per hour over the final 30 miles into Orlando. This segment includes the stations at Palatka, Deland, and Winter Park, Florida, which are served by Amtrak's *Silver Star* and *Silver Meteor*; and the Suspended Service Station on the CSX main line at Sanford, Florida ("the Sanford Main Line Station") which suffered hurricane damage and was removed from service prior to Hurricane Katrina. The segment ends at Amtrak's Orlando, Florida station.

Amtrak's *Auto Train* also operates over this segment between Jacksonville and the Sanford *Auto Train* station, which is located on a track that diverges from CSX's main line in Sanford. Sanford, 25 miles north of Orlando, is also the location of Amtrak's *Auto Train* maintenance facility. When the *Sunset Limited* terminated in Orlando between 1997 and 2005, the train arriving from Los Angeles discharged its passengers at the Orlando station; deadheaded (operated empty) an additional eight miles south to Stanton, Florida; reversed direction on a wye; and headed back to Sanford for servicing at the *Auto Train* facility. After overnight serving, the train returned to Orlando in the same manner to begin its trip to New Orleans and Los Angeles.

III. STATIONS

A. The Suspended Service Stations

Prior to the landfall of Hurricane Katrina in August 2005, the *Sunset Limited* served 18 stations between New Orleans, Louisiana and Orlando, Florida. This figure does not include the Sanford, Florida Main Line Station. Amtrak trains ceased stopping at that facility in February 2005, after it was seriously damaged by a series of hurricanes.

Twelve of these 18 stations, were served only by the *Sunset Limited*, and therefore are not presently served by Amtrak service. This report assumes that, trains will stop at all previously served stations, including Sanford. The 13 stations currently without service are referred to collectively as the “Suspended Service Stations”.

Suspended Service Stations
Bay St. Louis, MS
Gulfport, MS
Biloxi, MS
Pascagoula, MS
Mobile, AL
Atmore, AL
Pensacola, FL
Crestview, FL
Chipley, FL
Tallahassee, FL
Madison, FL
Lake City, FL
Sanford, FL

B. Station Restoration Requirements

If service is resumed, Suspended Service Stations must be restored to a state of good repair and brought into compliance with ADA requirements. Amtrak has developed an extensive process for assessing and completing work necessary to

restore stations, and for equipping them to meet ADA accessibility requirements and provide the level of service appropriate for their size and location.

1. ADA Requirements - Overview of the ADA Law and Standards

a. Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990

Amtrak strives to maintain the rail stations it serves in a state of good repair and ensure that they are readily accessible to, and usable by, passengers with disabilities as required by section 242(e)(2) of the *Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (42 U.S.C. 12162(e)(2))*. In February of 2009, Amtrak submitted to Congress “A Report on Accessibility and Compliance with the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990” (Stations ADA Report). The report describes the ADA requirements applicable to Amtrak and details Amtrak’s plan for making the 481 stations Amtrak currently serves compliant with the ADA (including the stations between New Orleans and Orlando that are served by trains other than the *Sunset Limited*).


The Stations ADA Report does not include restoration assessments and development plans for the Suspended Service Stations, since Amtrak does not currently serve them. This section, therefore, will focus on the improvements necessary if service is to be resumed to these 13 stations.

b. Ownership and Responsibility for Station Restoration

Under the ADA, a “station” generally consists of property used by the general public and related to the provision of rail transportation, including passenger platforms, designated waiting areas, ticketing areas and restrooms. Amtrak does not own the majority of the stations it serves, and at many stations different station components have different owners (e.g., the station building may be owned by the city while the station platform is owned by a freight railroad).

The ADA regulations allow station stakeholders to allocate ADA compliance responsibility by agreement among the parties (49 CFR 37.49 (e)), and the FRA has encouraged Amtrak to work out arrangements acceptable to all stakeholders. However, in the event the parties are unable to agree on an allocation mechanism, the regulations (49 CFR 37.49 (a) – (d)) apportion responsibility for ADA compliance in the manner set forth below:

Responsibility for ADA Compliance at Stations



The ADA’s broad definition of a “station” makes it difficult, if not impossible, to determine which entity is responsible for making and funding improvements when one entity owns the station structure (typically a public entity or Amtrak) and another entity owns the platforms (typically a private freight railroad). For ease of analysis, Amtrak assesses station ownership and ADA compliance responsibility using a separate-component approach, which treats each component (i.e., station structure, platform, and parking facility) as if it were a station unto itself.


Amtrak does not own any station structures, platforms, or parking facilities at the Suspended Service Stations. For ADA compliance purposes, however, Amtrak would be responsible for five of the station structures; five of the parking facilities; and all of the platforms should service be restored to these facilities.

C. Station Development Process

1. Stations Improvement Program and Schedule

Amtrak’s Stations Development Plan is founded on a set of station surveys completed for each of the 481 stations served by Amtrak that are required to be made ADA-compliant and are contained in the Stations ADA Report. For this report, Amtrak recently performed additional surveys at the 13 Suspended Service Stations that included assessments of the overall physical condition, accessibility, and state of good repair and ADA requirements that would have to be addressed if service is resumed to these stations. Some of the Suspended Service Stations were damaged or destroyed by Hurricane Katrina; and all will require investments to bring them into compliance with the ADA and for associated state-of-good-repair work.

The improvements made to these stations will follow the design and development processes depicted in the diagram below.



ADA Station Development Process

Project designs at all stations are initiated through the development of a conceptual design. The conceptual design describes the scope of the project, time frames for implementation, responsibilities for improvements and management process steps for completing the project.

This conceptual design phase is followed by the design and construction phases of the project. The nature and duration of the design and construction phases depends upon the size of the station involved. Since the 13 Suspended Service Stations are small stations with relatively low projected annual ridership, improvements made at these stations would follow a streamlined job-order contracting system. As the conceptual design is completed for a particular station, specific work orders would be issued to a job-order contractor to achieve the needed alterations. The projected duration of most of these projects from start to finish is 17 to 26 months.

2. Station-Related Agreements

In connection with the state of good repair and ADA work at the Suspended Service Stations, Amtrak would anticipate entering into an operating agreement with the local city or county. This agreement would specify that the local governmental entity would provide for all ongoing maintenance associated with the station facility. This agreement would also delineate the responsibility for the day-to-day station operating expenses. In addition, Amtrak would want to supplement its operating agreement with CSX, the host railroad, to address responsibility for CSX-owned station components.

3. Funding Considerations and Potential Legislation

An important consideration in restoring the Suspended Stations is the allocation of responsibility for funding the station improvement efforts. Amtrak estimates that, under applicable ADA regulations, Amtrak will be responsible for 61 percent of the restoration costs. The remainder will be the responsibility of the cities and/or counties in which the stations are located.

As Amtrak indicated in the ADA Stations Report, the shared responsibility for accessibility and ADA compliance work at many stations Amtrak serves presents very real and difficult coordination and cooperation challenges that Congress should consider and resolve through further guidance. Amtrak is concerned about the potential – perhaps probability, in some cases – for costly and prolonged negotiations and disputes among other parties (most often local governments and private parties) over which party will bear legal responsibility for achieving state of good repair and ADA compliance at stations with multiple owners. Amtrak is also concerned that the lack of funding by one or more of the

responsible parties would thwart or delay improvements by others, as the restoration of stations is often only possible via a unified effort.

Over the years, Amtrak itself has faced numerous funding challenges. Each year, limited capital funds are apportioned among various competing projects (e.g., refurbishing and replacing aging infrastructure and equipment), all of which are essential to Amtrak's mission of providing safe, reliable and efficient national intercity passenger rail services. Bringing all of the 481 stations Amtrak *currently* serves into a state of good repair and ADA compliance will require significant funding that has not yet been made available to Amtrak.

If Congress decides that passenger rail service should be resumed between New Orleans and Orlando, failure to address these issues is likely to delay service restoration and require Amtrak to divert resources from efforts to bring currently served stations into ADA compliance. An expeditious restoration of service at all of the Suspended Service Stations will require dedicated federal funding for the entire cost of state of good repair and ADA compliance improvements at these stations.

4. Preliminary Capital and Operating Cost Estimates

Recent surveys of the Suspended Service Stations (see Exhibit B) indicate that bringing them back into service and into compliance with ADA requirements will require approximately \$10.7 million in capital investments (in 2009 dollars). Exhibit C identifies the nature of the work required at each of these stations and the projected time requirement for its completion.

Two of the 13 Suspended Service Stations--Mobile, Alabama and Sanford, Florida--no longer have useable station buildings. The Mobile station building was significantly damaged by Hurricane Katrina; the property on which it was situated was sold by CSX to a developer, and the station was subsequently demolished. The Sanford Main Line Station was also damaged by hurricanes in 2004, resulting in its condemnation and termination of service prior to suspension of the *Sunset Limited*. The report assumes new facilities in these communities will be constructed in the same locations. The Sanford station accounts for the largest portion (approximately \$3.2 million) of the projected station capital costs. Due to the significant work required to design and build these two facilities, Amtrak estimates that between 20 and 26 months lead time will be needed.

Once the necessary capital improvements to the Suspended Service Stations have been made, an annual operating expenditure of approximately \$150,000-\$200,000 will be needed to maintain them in a state of good repair and ensure

that they remain ADA compliant. The table in Exhibit B delineates the projected annual operating expenditure for each of these stations.

5. Station Summary and Conclusion

If passenger rail service is to resume between New Orleans and Orlando, the 13 Suspended Service Stations will have to be brought up to a state of good repair and made ADA compliant. The projected cost of the necessary capital improvements is approximately \$10.7 million (in 2009 dollars). Annual operating expenses associated with maintaining these stations going forward, which Amtrak would look to localities to fund, are projected to be between \$150,000 and \$200,000. In order to avoid delays in resumption of service, and diversion of resources from ADA compliance efforts at stations Amtrak currently serves, Amtrak recommends that Congress provide additional funding for the entire \$10.7 million cost for station capital improvements, should the restoration of service over this route be deemed appropriate.

IV. ALTERNATIVES ANALYSIS

A. Service Options

Amtrak initially evaluated 12 alternatives to restore passenger rail service between New Orleans, Louisiana and Orlando, Florida. They are:

1. Restore tri-weekly *Sunset Limited* service between Los Angeles, California and Orlando, Florida.
2. Extend the daily *City of New Orleans* service, which currently operates between Chicago, Illinois and New Orleans, Louisiana, east from New Orleans to Sanford, Florida.
3. Implement daily stand-alone overnight service between New Orleans, Louisiana and Orlando, Florida.
4. Implement tri-weekly overnight service between New Orleans, Louisiana and Jacksonville, Florida.
5. Implement tri-weekly overnight service between New Orleans, Louisiana and Sanford, Florida.
6. Implement daily overnight service between New Orleans, Louisiana and Jacksonville, Florida.
7. Implement daily overnight service between New Orleans, Louisiana and Sanford, Florida.
8. Implement daily overnight service between New Orleans, Louisiana and Jacksonville, Florida, and extend Amtrak's *Palmetto* service, which currently operates between New York, New York and Savannah, Georgia, south to Jacksonville, Florida to connect with the new service.
9. Implement daily service, operating primarily during daytime hours, between New Orleans, Louisiana and Sanford, Florida.
10. Implement daily service during daytime hours between New Orleans, Louisiana and Jacksonville, Florida.
11. Implement tri-weekly service, operating primarily during daytime hours, between New Orleans, Louisiana and Sanford, Florida.

12. Extend Amtrak's daily *Palmetto* service, which currently operates between New York, New York and Savannah, Georgia, to New Orleans, Louisiana via Jacksonville, Florida.

In order to rank these 12 alternatives, schedules were developed for each and an initial analysis was performed that evaluated ridership, revenue, and operating cost, and projected operating loss. Each of the alternatives had various strengths and weaknesses.

The options for terminating the train at Sanford produced much lower ridership and revenue than operating the train an additional 21 miles to Orlando, one of the largest tourist destinations in the world. The daytime options also had relatively poor financial performance: the 18 to 18.5 hour trip times meant that one or both of the markets with the highest potential ridership – New Orleans and Central Florida – would be served before dawn or very late at night, and that same day connections to/from other Amtrak trains in New Orleans would not be possible.

Of the 12 alternatives, the following three preferred options were determined to be the most attractive.

- Option 1: Restore tri-weekly *Sunset Limited* service between Los Angeles, California and Orlando, Florida.
- Option 2: Extend the daily *City of New Orleans* service, which currently operates between Chicago, Illinois and New Orleans, Louisiana, east from New Orleans to Orlando, Florida.
- Option 3: Implement daily stand-alone overnight service between New Orleans, Louisiana and Orlando, Florida.

All three preferred options would provide overnight service, including sleeping car and meal service, between New Orleans and Orlando. They would also provide either through train or same day connecting service at New Orleans from the Orlando - New Orleans route to (i) the *Sunset Limited* route to Los Angeles, and (ii) the *City of New Orleans* route to Chicago. Under all of the options, the train would deadhead from Orlando to Sanford after each trip for overnight servicing at Amtrak's Sanford, Florida *Auto Train* maintenance facility. (The *Auto Train* is serviced during its daytime layover, so no interference with its servicing is anticipated.)

Projected ridership, capital/mobilization costs, and operating losses vary significantly among the three options. The daily service options – Options 2 and 3 – generate the highest ridership, but also have much higher capital and operating costs than restoring the tri-weekly service formerly provided by the *Sunset Limited* (Option 1). Section V of the report compares the ridership and financial performance of the three options.

The following is a description of the three preferred options:

OPTION 1	Restore Tri-Weekly <i>Sunset Limited</i> Service from Los Angeles, California to Orlando, Florida (Pre-Hurricane Katrina Service)
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Option 1 would restore the service that operated pre-Hurricane Katrina by extending the *Sunset Limited*, which has operated only between Los Angeles and New Orleans since Hurricane Katrina, from New Orleans to Orlando. This option ranked well in the aggregate, with considerably lower capital and operating costs than the other options due to its limited, tri-weekly frequency and the fact that it would not require purchase of additional equipment (which also gave it a shorter implementation time). It would reconnect the Florida/Gulf Coast Region to Amtrak western trains, and restore transcontinental passenger train service across the Southern United States. Because it would provide direct service, with no change of trains, for passengers making high mileage trips between the East and West Coasts, Option 1 generated by far the highest number of additional passenger miles (228.3) per train mile operated.

The major issue associated with this option is the route length. The route length (2,763 miles) presented significant operational challenges for the pre-Hurricane Katrina *Sunset Limited* with respect to equipment servicing, operational performance, crew scheduling and other issues.

Option 1 would require the hiring, training and qualifying of nine locomotive engineers, eight conductors, 12 mechanical employees, two station employees, and one supervisor. No additional on-board service employees would be required, and the tri-weekly service between Los Angeles and Orlando could be provided with the four equipment sets that are currently required to provide tri-weekly service between Los Angeles and New Orleans. Two additional locomotives would be needed, but it is anticipated that these could be obtained from stored locomotives returned to service. The present equipment-servicing function being performed in New Orleans for the *Sunset Limited* would be relocated to the Sanford, Florida *Auto Train* facility.

The proposed schedule for Option 1 is set forth below.

Sunset Limited			Proposed
Train 1			Option 1
Days of Operation			SuTuTh
Dp	Orlando, FL	ET	3:45 PM
Dp	Winter Park, FL		4:03 PM
Dp	Sanford, FL		4:26 PM
Dp	DeLand, FL		4:47 PM
Dp	Palatka, FL		5:33 PM
Ar	Jacksonville, FL		6:59 PM
Dp			7:18 PM
Dp	Lake City, FL		8:21 PM
Dp	Madison, FL		9:11 PM
Dp	Tallahassee, FL	ET	10:35 PM
Dp	Chipley, FL	CT	11:38 PM
Dp	Crestview, FL		1:02 AM
Ar	Pensacola, FL		2:29 AM
Dp			2:44 AM
Dp	Atmore, AL		4:14 AM
Dp	Mobile, AL		5:21 AM
Dp	Pascagoula, MS		6:03 AM
Dp	Biloxi, MS		6:28 AM
Dp	Gulfport, MS		6:47 AM
Dp	Bay St. Louis, MS		7:10 AM
Ar	New Orleans, LA		9:20 AM
Dp			11:55 AM
Dp	Schriever, LA		1:25 PM
Dp	New Iberia, LA		2:51 PM
Dp	Lafayette, LA		3:19 PM
Dp	Lake Charles, LA		4:50 PM
Dp	Beaumont, TX		6:43 PM
Ar	Houston, TX		9:13 PM
Dp			9:50 PM
Ar	San Antonio, TX		3:00 AM
Dp			5:40 AM
Dp	Del Rio, TX		8:35 AM
Dp	Sanderson, TX		11:10 AM
Dp	Alpine, TX	CT	1:24 PM
Ar	El Paso, TX	MT	4:40 PM
Dp			5:25 PM
Dp	Deming, NM		6:56 PM
Dp	Lordsburg, NM	MT	7:51 PM
Dp	Benson, AZ	MST	8:56 PM
Ar	Tucson, AZ		10:50 PM
Dp			11:35 PM
Ar	Maricopa, AZ		12:52 AM
Dp			1:02 AM
Dp	Yuma, AZ	MST	3:49 AM
Dp	Palm Springs, CA	PT	6:07 AM
Dp	Ontario, CA		7:35 AM
Dp	Pomona, CA		7:45 AM
Ar	Los Angeles, CA	PT	9:40 AM

Time Zone Symbols
 ET= Eastern
 CT= Central
 MT= Mountain
 MST= Mountain Standard
 PT= Pacific

Total
 Schedule
 Time
68' 55"
 ORL-LAX

Total
 Schedule
 Time
69' 50"
 LAX-ORL

Sunset Limited			Proposed
Train 2			Option 1
Days of Operation			SuWeFr
Dp	Los Angeles, CA	PT	2:30 PM
Dp	Pomona, CA		3:11 PM
Dp	Ontario, CA		3:24 PM
Dp	Palm Springs, CA	PT	5:06 PM
Dp	Yuma, AZ	MST	7:24 PM
Ar	Maricopa, AZ		10:07 PM
Dp			10:17 PM
Ar	Tucson, AZ		12:35 AM
Dp			1:20 AM
Dp	Benson, AZ	MST	2:20 AM
Dp	Lordsburg, NM	MT	5:20 AM
Dp	Deming, NM		6:15 AM
Ar	El Paso, TX		8:16 AM
Dp		MT	9:00 AM
Dp	Alpine, TX	CT	2:20 PM
Dp	Sanderson, TX		4:11 PM
Dp	Del Rio, TX		6:37 PM
Ar	San Antonio, TX		10:25 PM
Dp			1:00 AM
Ar	Houston, TX		5:45 AM
Dp			6:15 AM
Dp	Beaumont, TX		8:10 AM
Dp	Lake Charles, LA		9:34 AM
Dp	Lafayette, LA		11:20 AM
Dp	New Iberia, LA		11:46 AM
Dp	Schriever, LA		1:08 PM
Ar	New Orleans, LA		4:00 PM
Dp			8:00 PM
Dp	Bay St. Louis, MS		9:22 PM
Dp	Gulfport, MS		9:46 PM
Dp	Biloxi, MS		10:11 PM
Dp	Pascagoula, MS		10:36 PM
Dp	Mobile, AL		11:29 PM
Dp	Atmore, AL		12:24 AM
Ar	Pensacola, FL		1:59 AM
Dp			2:14 AM
Dp	Crestview, FL		3:19 AM
Dp	Chipley, FL	CT	4:42 AM
Dp	Tallahassee, FL	ET	7:54 AM
Dp	Madison, FL		9:09 AM
Dp	Lake City, FL		10:00 AM
Ar	Jacksonville, FL		11:46 AM
Dp			12:06 PM
Dp	Palatka, FL		1:09 PM
Dp	DeLand, FL		1:56 PM
Dp	Sanford, FL		2:19 PM
Dp	Winter Park, FL		2:43 PM
Ar	Orlando, FL	ET	3:20 PM

Time Zone Symbols
 ET= Eastern
 CT= Central
 MT= Mountain
 MST= Mountain Standard
 PT= Pacific

Total
 Schedule
 Time
68' 55"
 ORL-LAX

Total
 Schedule
 Time
69' 50"
 LAX-ORL

The Option 1 schedule is based upon the present pattern of operation on the *Sunset Limited* route west of New Orleans, i.e., a tri-weekly train operating between New Orleans and Los Angeles.

Amtrak is currently engaged in a separate study of a proposal (“Sunset West Proposal”) to improve service on the *Sunset Limited* route west of New Orleans by operating a daily train from New Orleans to San Antonio that would connect with a daily Chicago - San Antonio - Los Angeles *Texas Eagle*. The Sunset West Proposal, if implemented, would not preclude restoration of tri-weekly service from Orlando to New Orleans that would operate through to San Antonio or Los Angeles. However, implementation of the Sunset West Proposal would require Amtrak to acquire additional equipment in order to implement Option 1, with associated capital costs and a four-year implementation timeline, and would also require changes in Option 1 schedules and recalculation of its ridership, revenue and cost impacts. Should Amtrak proceed with implementing the Sunset West proposal, Amtrak will provide a supplemental update to this report regarding changes to Option 1 necessary to ensure compatibility with the restructured Sunset Limited service west of New Orleans, Louisiana.

OPTION 2	Extend daily <i>City of New Orleans</i> (Chicago, Illinois - New Orleans, Louisiana) Service from New Orleans to Orlando, Florida
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This option is an extension of the *City of New Orleans* train that currently operates daily between Chicago and New Orleans, and would be extended to Orlando on a daily basis. This daily service option significantly exceeded any of the 12 scenarios analyzed in terms of projected ridership because it would re-establish through passenger rail service between the large Midwest and Florida markets. However, it has much higher capital costs and projected operating losses than Option 1, and generates considerably fewer passenger miles (125.9) per train mile operated.

The Chicago to New Orleans route is shorter and has a much better on-time performance history than the *Sunset Limited* route from Los Angeles to New Orleans that would be extended under Option 1. Combining the Chicago-to-New Orleans and New Orleans-to-Orlando segments creates potential for operational issues due to increased trip length (1,694 route miles), but this potential is estimated to be significantly lower than the operational issues presented by Option 1.

The present equipment servicing function performed in New Orleans for the *City of New Orleans* would be relocated to the *Auto Train* maintenance facility in Sanford, Florida. Option 2 would require the hiring, training and qualifying of 18 locomotive engineers, 23 conductors, 24 mechanical employees, two station employees, 20 on-board service employees, and one supervisor. Since each equipment set would take five days to complete a Chicago to Orlando round trip, two additional equipment sets (each with six passenger cars) would have to be added to the three sets required for the current Chicago – New Orleans service which would require the purchase of between six and 14 new passenger cars.

The proposed Option 2 schedule is as follows:

City of New Orleans		Train 58	
Days of Operation			Proposed Option 2 Daily
Dp	Orlando, FL	ET	5:45 PM
Dp	Winter Park, FL		6:03 PM
Dp	Sanford, FL		6:24 PM
Dp	DeLand, FL		6:47 PM
Dp	Palatka, FL		7:33 PM
Ar	Jacksonville, FL		8:59 PM
Dp	Lake City, FL		9:18 PM
Dp	Madison, FL		10:21 PM
Dp	Tallahassee, FL	ET	11:11 PM
Dp	Chipley, FL	CT	12:35 AM
Dp	Crestview, FL		1:38 AM
Ar	Pensacola, FL		3:02 AM
Dp	Atmore, AL		4:29 AM
Dp	Mobile, AL		4:44 AM
Dp	Pascagoula, MS		6:14 AM
Dp	Biloxi, MS		7:21 AM
Dp	Gulfport, MS		8:03 AM
Dp	Bay St. Louis, MS		8:28 AM
Ar	New Orleans, LA		8:47 AM
Dp	Hammond, LA		9:10 AM
Dp	McComb, MS		11:20 AM
Dp	Brookhaven, MS		1:45 PM
Dp	Hazlehurst, MS		2:45 PM
Dp	Jackson, MS		3:32 PM
Dp	Yazoo City, MS		3:56 PM
Dp	Greenwood, MS		4:17 PM
Ar	Memphis, TN		5:44 PM
Dp	Newbern-Dyersburg, TN		6:42 PM
Dp	Fulton, KY		7:37 PM
Ar	Carbondale, IL		10:00 PM
Dp	Centralia, IL		10:40 PM
Dp	Effingham, IL		12:22 AM
Dp	Mattoon, IL		1:04 AM
Dp	Champaign-Urbana, IL		3:11 AM
Dp	Kankakee, IL		3:16 AM
Dp	Homewood, IL		4:10 AM
Dp	Chicago, IL	CT	4:57 AM
			5:23 AM
			6:10 AM
			7:13 AM
			7:44 AM
			9:00 AM

Time Zone Symbols
 ET= Eastern
 CT= Central

Total
 Schedule
 Time
40' 15"
 ORL-CHI

City of New Orleans		Train 59	
Days of Operation			Proposed Option 2 Daily
Dp	Chicago, IL	CT	8:00 PM
Dp	Homewood, IL		8:54 PM
Dp	Kankakee, IL		9:23 PM
Dp	Champaign-Urbana, IL		10:34 PM
Dp	Mattoon, IL		11:13 PM
Dp	Effingham, IL		11:37 PM
Dp	Centralia, IL		12:25 AM
Ar	Carbondale, IL		1:21 AM
Dp	Fulton, KY		1:26 AM
Dp	Newbern-Dyersburg, TN		3:14 AM
Ar	Memphis, TN		3:56 AM
Dp	Greenwood, MS		6:27 AM
Dp	Yazoo City, MS		6:50 AM
Dp	Jackson, MS		9:00 AM
Dp	Hazlehurst, MS		9:51 AM
Dp	Brookhaven, MS		11:20 AM
Dp	McComb, MS		11:55 AM
Dp	Hammond, LA		12:16 PM
Ar	New Orleans, LA		12:40 PM
Dp	Bay St. Louis, MS		1:28 PM
Dp	Gulfport, MS		3:32 PM
Dp	Biloxi, MS		5:30 PM
Dp	Pascagoula, MS		6:52 PM
Dp	Mobile, AL		7:16 PM
Dp	Atmore, AL		7:41 PM
Ar	Pensacola, FL		8:06 PM
Dp	Crestview, FL		8:59 PM
Dp	Chipley, FL		9:54 PM
Dp	Tallahassee, FL	CT	11:29 PM
Dp	Madison, FL	ET	11:44 PM
Dp	Lake City, FL		12:49 AM
Ar	Jacksonville, FL		2:12 AM
Dp	Palatka, FL		5:24 AM
Dp	DeLand, FL		6:39 AM
Dp	Sanford, FL		7:30 AM
Dp	Winter Park, FL		9:21 AM
Dp	Orlando, FL	ET	9:41 AM
			10:44 AM
			11:31 AM
			11:54 PM
			12:18 PM
			12:50 PM

Total
 Schedule
 Time
39' 50"
 CHI-ORL

OPTION 3

Daily Service between New Orleans, Louisiana and Orlando, Florida (stand-alone train)

Option 3 would implement a new stand-alone service that would operate daily between New Orleans and Orlando. This option would produce a more consistent service due to shorter route length (786 miles), and more frequent mechanical servicing since the train would be serviced at New Orleans or Sanford after each relatively short trip. However, Option 3 has the highest projected operating losses and produces the lowest number of additional passenger miles (80.5) per train mile operated, in large part because all passengers traveling to points north or west of New Orleans would have to change trains.

Option 3 would require the hiring, training and qualifying of 18 engineers, 23 conductors, 48 mechanical employees, two station employees, 30 on-board service employees, and one supervisor. It would utilize three equipment sets, each with four passenger cars. Like Option 2, it would require the purchase of between six and 14 new passenger cars. Option 3 would also require three additional locomotives (one per equipment set) that Amtrak anticipates could be supplied from stored locomotives returned to service.

The proposed Option 3 schedule is as follows:

Gulf Wind Train 801			Proposed Option 3
Days of Operation		Daily	
Dp	Orlando, FL	ET	3:00 PM
Dp	Winter Park, FL		3:18 PM
Dp	Sanford, FL		3:39 PM
Dp	DeLand, FL		4:02 PM
Dp	Palatka, FL		4:48 PM
Ar	Jacksonville, FL		6:14 PM
Dp			6:24 PM
Dp	Lake City, FL		7:27 PM
Dp	Madison, FL		8:17 PM
Dp	Tallahassee, FL	ET	9:41 PM
Dp	ChIPLEY, FL	CT	10:44 PM
Dp	Crestview, FL		12:08 AM
Ar	Pensacola, FL		1:30 AM
Dp			1:40 AM
Dp	Atmore, AL		3:10 AM
Dp	Mobile, AL		4:22 AM
Dp	Pascagoula, MS		5:04 AM
Dp	Biloxi, MS		5:29 AM
Dp	Gulfport, MS		5:48 AM
Dp	Bay St. Louis, MS		6:11 AM
Ar	New Orleans, LA		8:20 AM

Time Zone Symbols
ET= Eastern
CT= Central

Total Schedule Time 18' 20" ORL-NOL

Gulf Wind Train 802			Proposed Option 3
Days of Operation		Daily	
Dp	New Orleans, LA		5:30 PM
Dp	Bay St. Louis, MS		6:48 PM
Dp	Gulfport, MS		7:12 PM
Dp	Biloxi, MS		7:37 PM
Dp	Pascagoula, MS		8:02 PM
Dp	Mobile, AL		8:55 PM
Dp	Atmore, AL		9:50 PM
Ar	Pensacola, FL		11:25 PM
Dp			11:34 PM
Dp	Crestview, FL		12:39 AM
Dp	ChIPLEY, FL	CT	2:02 AM
Dp	Tallahassee, FL	ET	5:14 AM
Dp	Madison, FL		6:26 AM
Dp	Lake City, FL		7:17 AM
Ar	Jacksonville, FL		9:08 AM
Dp			9:17 AM
Dp	Palatka, FL		10:20 AM
Dp	DeLand, FL		11:07 AM
Dp	Sanford, FL		11:30 PM
Dp	Winter Park, FL		11:54 AM
Ar	Orlando, FL	ET	12:25 PM

Total Schedule Time 17' 55" NOL-ORL

B. Train Scheduling

The proposed schedules for the three options were created in what are called "Schedule Skeletons." This type of analysis breaks down each schedule option into sub-segments between stations. The running times and actual train schedules developed through this process take into account authorized speeds and route characteristics on each segment. They also reflect the time required for acceleration and deceleration at station stops, and include allowances for possible train delays and miscellaneous adjustments for other factors that will impact running time.

The schedules are based upon:

1. Pure Running Time (PRT): The optimum or minimum time the train will take to operate between passenger stations and/or other pre-determined points, exclusive of station dwell time or delays.
2. Station Dwell Time: The normal amount of time included in schedules to accommodate activities at station stops, including the loading/unloading of passengers and baggage and (where

applicable) crew changes, locomotive fueling and other train servicing requirements.

3. Schedule Recovery Time: Time added to a schedule to enable a train to “recover” to its public schedule after incurring delays. Recovery Time can take two forms:
 - Standard Recovery Time (SRT): Additional schedule time that is based on a percentage of PRT in a given segment--usually about 8 percent. This time is intended to permit recovery from all delays, regardless of cause.
 - Additional Recovery Time (ART): Usually the time allotted for opposing passenger trains to meet in single-track territory. The amount of added time varies with individual schedules and configuration of the rail line--usually at least five minutes per passenger train scheduled to be met.

The schedules developed for all three options included a minimum of 10 percent SRT. This percentage takes into consideration that the host railroads should give passenger trains dispatching preference over freight trains, as required by Federal law, and also assumes that the rail line will be satisfactorily maintained so that passenger trains will not be burdened with an excessive level of slow-order delays. In addition, 15 to 20 minutes of extra Recovery Time was included for each train that was scheduled to meet a passenger train traveling in the opposite direction in dark (non-signaled) territory.

Under all three options, the scheduled running time between New Orleans and Orlando (approximately 18.5 hours) is equivalent to the *Sunset Limited's* running times between these points prior to the 2000 schedule lengthening. Amtrak believes that these schedules can be reliably achieved due to:

- the recovery time built into the schedules that is described above;
- CSX's much improved performance in handling Amtrak trains since New Orleans - Orlando service last operated in 2005 (The on-time performance of Amtrak's *Silver Service* trains on CSX between New York and Miami has improved from 18% in fiscal year 2005 to 70% during the first eight months of fiscal year 2009); and
- host railroads' increased focus on the performance of Amtrak trains since enactment of PRIIA, which includes provisions aimed at

improving on-time performance and ensuring passenger trains are granted preference over freight transportation as required by Federal law.

V. FINANCIAL ANALYSIS

Financial performance of the 12 alternatives initially evaluated was estimated using Amtrak's standard modeling methodology for long distance services. Beginning with a proposed train schedule, each alternative was evaluated for ridership and revenue performance, operational requirements, and anticipated direct operating costs attributable to the service. These direct costs do not include interest, depreciation and general overhead expenses. A high level capital needs assessment for station and equipment investment requirements was also conducted.

A. Ridership/Revenue Projections

Ridership and revenue impacts for each alternative were estimated utilizing models and data Amtrak has developed to measure the impact of new or changed services. The inputs included surveys of Amtrak's long distance passengers; socio-economic data; and forecasts of population and income in the areas served by each station. The ridership and revenue projections reflect the net impact of adding New Orleans-Orlando service on both the subject route and on other Amtrak routes that would be impacted by adding that route (e.g., the *Silver Meteor* route between New York and Miami, which would gain ridership from passengers traveling on that route to connect to, or from the New Orleans-Orlando route. The models take into account variations in ridership demand that are attributable to factors such as the time of day at which stations are served and whether potential passengers are required to change trains in order to reach their destination, which negatively impacts ridership. The revenue figures also include on-board food service revenues.

B. Operating Cost Analysis

Projected operating costs for each of the 12 alternatives were developed primarily from projected staffing requirements and unit costs derived from the operating costs of providing similar services. The different cost categories included are as follows:

- Host Railroad Costs: Payments to host railroads, primarily for maintenance-of-way, and incentives for on-time performance.
- Fuel Costs: Calculated using a Gross Ton Mileage (GTM) model that estimates costs for each proposal based on train tonnage, mileage and per-gallon fuel cost.

- T&E and OBS Labor: Labor costs for train and engine (T&E) crews – conductors and engineers – and for on-board service (OBS) crews that provide food and customer service on trains. These labor costs were modeled based on anticipated crew assignments and existing wage/benefit rates.
- Mechanical Costs: Based on average costs for specific functions such as turnaround servicing, maintenance of equipment and related support. Turnaround costs were estimated based upon the average cost-per-train turn. Maintenance expenses such as preventative maintenance and bad order repair costs were estimated based on the typical average cost-per-unit for each additional car/locomotive required for each option. Support costs were calculated as a percentage of the direct mechanical costs.
- Remaining Direct Costs: Other shared costs associated with advertising, marketing, stations, yard operations, police, environmental, insurance, and commissions were estimated based on statistical drivers unique to each cost area.
- Non-direct Costs: Costs such as General and Administrative (G&A), administrative support, and computer systems otherwise not included in the cost projections.

C. Financial Results - Operations

The table below provides summary financial results for each of the three preferred options, including estimated revenue, direct costs and net financial impact:

Estimated Performance (dollar figures are in Millions)	Option 1 (Tri-Weekly <i>Sunset Limited</i>)	Option 2 (Daily <i>City of New Orleans</i> Extension)	Option 3 (Daily Stand- Alone Train)
Total Riders	53,300	96,100	79,900
Rank, Total Riders	3	1	2
Passenger Related Revenue	\$6.00	\$9.20	\$5.60
Rank, Revenue	2	1	3
Expenses			
Host Railroad	\$0.90	\$2.00	\$2.00
Fuel	\$1.50	\$2.50	\$2.50
T&E Labor	\$2.90	\$5.70	\$5.70
OBS Labor	\$0.30	\$2.50	\$2.70
Mechanical	\$1.40	\$2.60	\$5.90
Remaining Direct Costs	\$3.80	\$5.60	\$5.20
Total Direct Costs	\$10.80	\$20.90	\$24.00
Rank Direct Costs	1	2	3
Operating Contribution (Loss)	(\$4.80)	(\$11.70)	(\$18.40)
Rank, Financial Performance	1	2	3
Fare Box Recovery	56%	44%	23%
Rank, Fare Box Recovery	1	2	3

Fare box recovery represents the portion of direct operating costs that will be recovered from passenger revenues.

D. Mobilization and Capital Costs

Mobilization (start-up) costs include labor for qualifying crews over the territory, capital costs associated with stations and the Sanford mechanical facility, equipment purchase costs, host railroad capital costs (if required), and potential costs for Positive Train Control. These cost areas are examined further below:

1. Labor

Training costs, and the costs of qualifying engineers and conductors, are estimated at \$1.4 million for Option 1, or \$2.3 million for Options 2 and 3.

2. Identified Capital Costs

- Stations: The proposed restoration of passenger service would require capital for both returning stations to a state of good repair and meeting ADA requirements. Estimated station capital costs are \$10.7 million.
- Mechanical: The addition of the proposed service will require \$600,000 in capital for improvements at the Sanford mechanical facility.
- Equipment: For Options 2 and 3, the capital required to increase Amtrak's equipment fleet is estimated at \$24 million to \$63 million, depending upon the number of new passenger cars that have to be acquired (discussed in Section VI.D). This estimate is preliminary: Amtrak has not purchased comparable equipment in many years, and the unit cost of new passenger rail cars depends heavily upon the total number of cars ordered. Option 1 would not require additional equipment.

3. Host Railroad Capital Costs

Host railroad capital requirements, if any, may also vary significantly depending upon the option chosen and on the outcome of modeling and negotiations. CSX has indicated

that it will seek capacity improvements prior to any restoration of service.

Amtrak believes that it should not be required to fund infrastructure investments to increase capacity as a prerequisite to resuming the tri-weekly service formerly provided by the *Sunset Limited* (Option 1). The states along the route provided funding to CSX for capacity and other improvements to accommodate tri-weekly New Orleans - Jacksonville service when that service was initiated in 1993.

If Option 2 or Option 3, which would provide daily service between New Orleans and Orlando, is selected, Amtrak believes that a determination of what, if any, capital investments are required to accommodate increased passenger service should be based upon capacity modeling studies and analysis conducted in collaboration by CSX and Amtrak. The limited time period provided for completion of this report did not allow sufficient time for these modeling efforts. If modeling shows a need for capital improvements, engineering work would also be required to determine the exact costs and timing of any required capacity investments.

4. Positive Train Control Requirement

In addition to the above costs, another cost item that must be considered for restoration of service between New Orleans and Orlando is Positive Train Control (PTC). The Rail Safety Improvement Act of 2008 mandates that, by December 31, 2015, PTC be installed on those lines of Class-1 railroads that carry over five million gross tons of traffic annually, and have either toxic-by-inhalation hazardous materials (TIH) traffic or passenger trains. The Act also gives FRA authority to require PTC installation on other rail lines.

CSX has told Amtrak that, if passenger service is reinstated on the New Orleans-to-Jacksonville portion of the route, the Rail Safety Improvement Act mandate could trigger requirements for PTC installations on significant portions of the route where PTC is not required for CSX's freight operations. Amtrak's preliminary estimate of these costs is \$20 million.

VI. IMPLEMENTATION REQUIREMENTS

Before restoring service, Amtrak must hire, train and qualify necessary employees to perform a number of critical functions including train operations, on-board service, mechanical servicing and station staffing. In addition, Amtrak must provide planning and engineering resources for design and construction of necessary station repairs and improvements; restore and where required purchase equipment; and work with our host railroad partners on service implementation and potential infrastructure upgrades.

The following sections examine each of these areas in greater detail.

A. Staffing

Amtrak has well established protocols and experience in hiring, training and qualifying staff needed to support train operations. Except for supervisory employees, all of the positions identified above are covered by union agreements. In general, these agreements require that positions be awarded to existing employees on a seniority basis. Hiring of new employees can only take place when existing employees choose not to pursue the newly created position(s), and new employees must also be hired to backfill positions held by existing employees who choose to transfer to the newly created positions.

Once employees are selected or hired for the new positions, they must be trained. Conductors and engineers must be qualified to operate the specific type of equipment utilized, and must also be qualified on the operating rules and physical characteristics of each of the routes over which they will be operating trains.

The need to thoroughly train and qualify engineers and conductors requires significant lead time. For example, after screening, hiring and classroom training, a process that takes approximately four months to complete, new engineer-trainees are required to complete a minimum of 240 hours of throttle time and 480 hours of on-the-job training to obtain certification. Significant additional time is then required to qualify engineers on the physical characteristics of the territories over which they will be operating. This FRA-mandated qualification process requires engineers to make as many as 36 round trips, in the cab of the locomotive accompanied by a qualified engineer, on each route segment over which they will be operating trains until they are thoroughly familiar with every characteristic of the line (i.e., the location of every grade crossing, signal, speed restrictions, etc.). The process to certify and qualify train and engine crews is estimated to take up to 16 months, bringing the total time to hire, train and qualify all of these employees to approximately 20 months from notice to proceed.

Hiring of on-board service, mechanical and station employees, while not as time consuming due to fewer training and qualification requirements, follows a similar process. The estimated lead time requirement for hiring and training these employees is between one and four months.

The following table shows the number of train and engine crew employees required to operate Option 1 (tri-weekly) and Options 2 and 3 (daily) services:

Tri-Weekly Service		
Crew Base	Engineers	Conductors
Jacksonville (JAX)	5	5
New Orleans (NOL)	4	3
Daily Service		
Crew Base	Engineers	Conductors
Jacksonville (JAX)	11	14
New Orleans (NOL)	7	9

The following table represents qualifying trips and work-time requirements for train and engine crew positions. Since all train and engine employees must be qualified to operate over all routes staffed by the crew base where they are employed, it includes qualifying trips on routes in addition to New Orleans – Orlando.

City Pair	Engineer	Conductor
JAX – Miami, FL	30 round trips	1 year worked, 3 round trips on head end
JAX – Tampa, FL	20 round trips	1 year worked, 3 round trips on head end
JAX – Florence, SC	22 round trips	1 year worked, 3 round trips on head end
JAX – Hamlet, NC	35 round trips	1 year worked, 3 round trips on head end
JAX – Pensacola, FL	36 round trips	1 year worked, 3 round trips on head end
NOL – Pensacola, FL	18 round trips	1 year worked, 3 round trips on head end
NOL – Jackson, MS	12 round trips	1 year worked, 3 round trips on head end
NOL – Beaumont, TX	16 round trips	1 year worked, 3 round trips on head end
NOL – Yard	5 trips	1 year worked, 5 trips

B. Station Restoration and Related Improvements

The capital investments required to restore the 13 Suspended Service Stations to a state of good repair, and bring them into compliance with the ADA, are the same for all three options. Section III and Exhibits B and C identify the work required at each station; describe the process for designing and constructing the necessary capital improvements; identify the third party participation/agreements that will be required; and show the projected periods, ranging from 9 to 26 months, for completion of the necessary work at each station.

C. Equipment Procurement

No additional passenger cars will be required for Option 1 (restoration of the tri-weekly *Sunset Limited*), as the eastern terminus of this train can be moved from New Orleans to Sanford using existing passenger equipment sets. The two additional locomotives required for this Option, and the two to three locomotives required for Options 2 and 3, can be provided through planned overhaul of stored units.

Options 2 (daily *City of New Orleans* extension) and Option 3 (daily stand-alone train) will require purchase of between six and 14 new passenger rail cars, a process that will take approximately four years for design, procurement and construction. At least some, and perhaps all, of the passenger cars required for these options will have to be purchased new, since Amtrak does not have sufficient long distance equipment to meet requirements on existing trains, and has only a small number of repairable “wreck status” long distance cars. A new equipment purchase would have to be part of a larger order, as the high upfront design and tooling costs associated with building passenger rail cars make it uneconomic to construct them in small quantities.

VII. PROJECTED SERVICE IMPLEMENTATION TIMELINE

The timeline in Exhibit C lists each of the major actions required to implement Options 1, 2 or 3, and the number of months required to complete them from the date of notice to proceed. More detailed explanations of how the time periods were calculated, and the nature and timing of the specific activities required for each action, can be found in Sections III and VI of this report.

The projected total service implementation timeline varies from 20 months for Option 1 to 48 months for Option 2 and Option 3. As discussed in Section VI.A, the long lead time activity common to all three options that must be completed before service is initiated is the hiring, training and qualification of train crews. Completion of FRA and Amtrak requirements governing this process is projected to require 20 months. The projected 48-month implementation timeline for Options 2 and 3 is driven by the need to acquire additional equipment, which is discussed in Section VI.C.

These projected timelines are tight, and are subject to a number of contingencies. The station state of good repair/ADA work could be delayed if protracted negotiations with property owners are necessary. In addition, the work required at 3 of the 13 Suspended Service Stations is projected to take 23-26 months, which is longer than the projected 20 month timeline for Option 1. It may be possible to resume service on the route before all of the station work is completed. The timelines could also be impacted by resolution of any host railroad issues regarding service restoration, and the construction of any track capacity improvements determined to be necessary.

VIII. PUBLIC OUTREACH

Section 226 of PRIIA states:

“In developing the plan, Amtrak shall consult with representatives from the States of Louisiana, Alabama, Mississippi, and Florida, railroad carriers whose tracks may be used for such service, rail labor, and other entities as appropriate.”

In order to fulfill this requirement, Amtrak contacted a wide variety of stakeholders, including public officials from the federal, state and local levels, regional organizations and rail advocates.

A. Outreach Methodology

Several methods were used to meet the outreach requirements of Section 226. Due to the large number of varying interests, Amtrak established four groups and types of contact to provide appropriate levels of outreach:

Level	Type of Contact
Group I	Written notice and/or direct contact through an individual or group meeting
Group II	Personalized letter including mid-level detail
Group III	Form letter with high-level detail
Group IV	Written notice and/or direct contact to key members of Congress

1. Group I

Group I consisted of primary stakeholders, listed in Exhibit J, including federal, state and local officials from Alabama, Florida, Louisiana and Mississippi. Local official contacts were limited to the municipalities served prior to the 2005 suspension of service between New Orleans and Orlando. This group also included major rail advocacy groups and regional planning authorities. Exhibit F is an example of the communication these representatives received prior to a second communication to arrange a meeting. While every party was contacted regarding a personalized meeting, some were not able to be accommodated due to scheduling conflicts.

2. Group II

Group II consisted of representatives of tourism groups, Chambers of Commerce, and communities that were not regularly-scheduled stops on the route prior to 2005. This group of stakeholders, listed in Exhibit K, received a letter that explained the process by which Amtrak established the preferred options for returning service east of New Orleans. Exhibit G is an example of the letter these parties received.

3. Group III

This group, listed in Exhibit L, consisted primarily of individual stakeholders such as concerned citizens, Amtrak passengers and individual passenger rail advocates. This was the largest group of individuals included in the outreach process. Each stakeholder received a letter explaining the process and identifying the preferred options determined by the study team, as shown in Exhibit H.

4. Group IV

Group IV consisted of key members of Congress. Amtrak advised them of the status of the study and that outreach was about to begin should they receive communications from their constituents about any of the upcoming meetings. Exhibit I is an example of the letter these key members received.

The personal outreach (Group I) process began on April 23, 2009, after members of Congress (Group IV) were notified and continued throughout the month of May. The primary reason for beginning the outreach on this date was to provide the study team enough time to be able to build a comprehensive list of scenarios, analyze the pros and cons accordingly, and collect enough data to present to the stakeholders in order to appropriately address most of their questions and concerns. This allowed Amtrak's team to develop the three preferred options to provide a relevant and viable operation for the traveling public.

During stakeholder meetings, all attendees were briefed on the history of the pre-Hurricane Katrina *Sunset Limited* passenger rail service; the service suspension; variables affecting service restoration; the requirements for the study identified in

Section 226 of PRIIA; the three preferred options with some level of detail; and next steps (including addressing the lack of a funding mechanism).

Amtrak went into greater levels of detail in discussing the process, described in this report, under which each of the preferred options was analyzed, including their projected ridership, financial performance and capital costs and their respective rankings. The explanation of these metrics was intended to facilitate a clearer understanding of the process, as well as how the results were determined. Finally, Amtrak reviewed each of the three options, and allowed each party to present comments and concerns.

Most of those in the Gulf Coast Region who provided comments via Amtrak's stakeholder interviews and outreach efforts considered Option 3 – a daily stand alone train between New Orleans and Orlando that would require the highest level of operating funding – to be the most desirable of the three preferred options because it would provide a reliable daily service. A large portion of the passengers who have communicated directly with Amtrak to urge restoration of service indicated that they had used the *Sunset Limited* on trips between Florida and points west of New Orleans, for which Option 1 would restore direct service.

IX. RAIL STAKEHOLDERS

A. Host Railroads

Amtrak also contacted CSX and Norfolk Southern, the two host railroads whose tracks would be used for the restored service. A letter dated March 11, 2009, was directed to the NRPC Operations Officer (designated Amtrak contact) at both companies notifying them of the Section 226 requirement and that the study was underway (see Exhibits D and E). On April 8, 2009, Amtrak sent CSX and Norfolk Southern a copy of the three final schedule options being considered and requested their comments, which both companies provided in subsequent letters and verbal conversations with Amtrak management.

Norfolk Southern, whose tracks the service would use for approximately three miles, recommended that Amtrak validate the Pure Running Times (PRTs) underlying the proposed schedules. Amtrak agrees that field checks to validate these PRTs would be valuable, either before or shortly after any resumption of service; schedules would be adjusted as necessary based on the findings of field checks.

CSX, whose tracks the service would use for the remaining 760 plus miles, also returned comments. CSX's primary comments and Amtrak's responses can be summarized as follows:

- CSX indicated an anticipated need for capacity investments to support the proposed service. This issue is discussed in Section V.D.3.
- CSX stated that it would require capacity modeling before agreeing to a schedule. As stated in Section V.D.3, Amtrak believes that the schedules proposed are reasonable and achievable, but stands willing to participate in joint capacity modeling efforts.
- CSX noted the potential for the Positive Train Control (PTC) requirements included in the Rail Safety Improvement Act of 2008 to impact the cost of service. CSX is currently studying the PTC requirements of its network and indicated that it will share the results with Amtrak. (FRA is also expected to issue shortly proposed regulations addressing the interpretation and implementation of PTC requirements.) Amtrak's projected

capital/mobilization costs include a preliminary estimate of \$20 million for PTC costs.

Section 226 directs Amtrak to include in the plan “any proposals for legislation necessary to support . . . restoration of service”. Provisions of the Rail Passenger Service Act, now codified at 49 USC § 24308, give Amtrak the right to use any track or other rail facility in the United States, and to obtain Surface Transportation Board adjudication of any disputes regarding Amtrak’s access rights and the terms and conditions governing Amtrak’s exercise of them. Therefore, Amtrak does not believe at this time that additional legislation is necessary to enhance Amtrak’s legal rights to restore service.

B. Labor Organizations

Amtrak notified the General Chairmen of the Operating and On-Board Service labor organizations (see Exhibit N) that would have interest and possible input into the resumption of passenger service between New Orleans and Florida by letter dated April 8, 2009 (see Exhibit M). Copies of the letter were also sent to the International Presidents and Legislative Directors of each respective labor organization.

X. PUBLIC BENEFITS

Restoration of passenger rail service along the Gulf Coast could provide a modest contribution to regional economic development. It would also enhance connectivity within Amtrak's route system, and facilitate travel in some city pair markets. Whether service restoration would produce economic stimulus benefits depends upon whether new public funding is made available for associated capital and operating costs.

A. Gulf Coast Region Economy

Even before Hurricane Katrina and the current recession, most of the region between New Orleans and Orlando that was served by the suspended *Sunset Limited* service had considerably less economic prosperity than the United States as a whole. As depicted in Exhibit O, median household income in 2007 was below the national average in the counties where 15 of the 19 *Sunset Limited* stations were located. Seven of these 19 stations are located in counties where median household income was more than 20% below the national average.

Hurricane Katrina had a devastating impact on the residents and economies of the Gulf Coast Region in Alabama, Mississippi and Louisiana. Its effects continue to be felt today, and the region's recovery from Hurricane Katrina's economic consequences has been hampered by the current economic recession.

Prior to the severe economic downturn in the Fall of 2008, the local economies along the former *Sunset Limited* route east of New Orleans had begun to rebound from the effects of Hurricane Katrina. Population data recently released (see Exhibit P) show that counties directly served by that route saw population grow by an average of about 0.9% between 2007 and 2008, in line with the national average. The Central Gulf counties in Louisiana, Mississippi and Alabama led the increase with an average 2.7% rise in population. The population of Orleans Parish in Louisiana rose 8.2% as residents returned and the economy began to show signs of revitalization.

In terms of job creation (depicted in Exhibit Q), metropolitan areas along the *Sunset* route showed fairly robust job growth from 2006 to 2007 across a range of industries, including construction (up 7.9%), retail trade (up 11.1%) and accommodations and food services (up 8.8%). The growth in accommodations/food services employment suggests a rebound in tourism, which is an important component of economies in the region. Major tourist destinations along the route include the end-point cities of Orlando and New Orleans, casinos and hotels in

the Biloxi and Gulfport areas of Mississippi, and beaches and resorts in Alabama and Florida.

B. Economic Benefits

Restoration of passenger rail service in the Gulf Coast Region would create jobs; increase state/local tax revenues; and could give a boost to the area's local tourism industry. Daily passenger rail service would provide increased mobility and local economic benefits, although it would require much higher levels of public funding than tri-weekly service.

Service restoration would trigger requirements for at least \$11.3 million in station and track capital investments along the route. The daily service options – Options 2 and 3 – would require additional capital expenditures of \$24-63 million for new equipment. Such expenditures would create jobs, primarily in construction, manufacturing and material supply, for the duration of these projects, although jobs associated with the manufacture of new equipment would likely be located in portions of the United States outside of the Gulf Coast Region where existing facilities for passenger railcar manufacturing are located.

Operation of the service is projected to create between 32 and 122 permanent Amtrak jobs, depending upon which option is chosen. It would also lead to additional expenditures for food, supplies and lodging for train crews that will benefit local economies.

These direct expenditures can be expected to produce spillover economic benefits. The spillover benefits include job creation in other industries such as retail trade and tourism, and increased state and local tax revenues attributable to wage taxes on newly-created jobs and increased economic activity. Investments in stations frequently stimulate both public and private investment that create jobs and expand business opportunities in the surrounding region.

Expenditures to restore and operate passenger rail service between New Orleans and Orlando would benefit local economies. Whether those expenditures would benefit the U.S. economy and produce net public benefits will depend upon how they are funded. If new funding is made available – i.e., funding in addition to the Amtrak capital and operating funding authorized in PRIIA – then these expenditures will result in a net increase in job creation and economic activity. However, if Amtrak were required to use any already authorized funds to restore and operate service, such expenditures would produce no net public benefits, since Amtrak would have to divert funds from other routes and projects that also produce public benefits.

C. Mobility Benefits

Reinstitution of New Orleans-to-Orlando service would restore transcontinental passenger rail service between Florida/Gulf Coast communities and the Central and Western United States. This would enhance connectivity within Amtrak's national route network, and facilitate travel between many city pairs for which no passenger rail service or only very circuitous service is available today.

Restored passenger service would also provide a public transportation option in communities that have few or no other intercity public transportation services. Seven of the 12 communities between New Orleans and Jacksonville in which the Suspended Service Stations are located do not have air service. Four have no intercity bus service, leaving them without any public transportation option. Service restoration that is accompanied by actions to enhance intermodal connectivity at rail stations could better integrate passenger rail service with other modes, including regional bus services and airports along the Gulf Coast.

The expenditures for station ADA compliance and associated state-of-good repair work will enhance mobility for disabled individuals. Here again, whether these expenditures produce public benefits will depend upon how they are funded. If funding must be diverted from other Amtrak capital projects, including bringing all stations Amtrak currently serves into compliance with ADA, there will be no net public benefits.

D. Energy and Environmental Benefits

Option 1 (*Sunset Limited extension*), which generates the highest number of additional passenger miles per train mile (228.3), may produce some energy savings due to diversion of trips from automobiles and airplanes that, according to Bureau of Transportation Statistics, are less energy efficient than intercity rail. Option 2 (*City of New Orleans extension*) and Option 3 (stand-alone New Orleans – Orlando train) are not likely to produce measurable environmental or energy benefits because they generate relatively few additional passenger miles per train mile operated: 125.9 for Option 2, and 80.5 for Option 3.

The relative circuitry – particularly for Options 2 and 3 – of the rail route between most city pairs in which direct rail service would be offered also limits the potential for restored service to contribute to reductions in energy consumption and emissions. For example, the distance between New Orleans and Orlando is much longer by rail (769 miles) than by highway (639 miles) or air (546 miles), which means that, between those cities, the greater energy efficiency of intercity passenger rail is offset, at least in part; by the longer distance trains must travel to connect them.

XI. CONCLUSIONS AND NEXT STEPS

In accord with Section 226 of PRIIA, this plan provides for the restoration of passenger rail service between New Orleans and Sanford/Orlando by identifying three preferred options for service restoration and the costs/timelines associated with them. While one of these options is the restoration of the pre-Hurricane Katrina tri-weekly service provided by the suspended *Sunset Limited*, Amtrak felt that it was important to evaluate other alternatives that would provide daily service and potentially larger public benefits, albeit at a considerably higher cost.

The plan, including the consultation with stakeholders required by Section 226, has been completed within the nine-month time frame specified in that provision. However, as a result of this aggressive schedule, it was not possible to quantify capital costs that may be required for restoration of passenger service for capacity investments in CSX-owned tracks.

The projected timeline for restoring service is 20 months for restoration of the previously operated tri-weekly *Sunset Limited* service, due to the need to hire and qualify train crews and carry out station restoration/ADA work. Implementation of daily service Options 2 and 3 would take approximately four years, since these options would also require acquisition of new equipment.

The projected costs associated with restoring service include mobilization/capital costs ranging from \$32.7 million to \$96.6 million, and annual operating losses that are expected to range from \$4.8 million to \$18.4 million. The lower figures represent the projected cost of restoring the formerly-operated tri-weekly *Sunset Limited* service.

Section 226 also directs Amtrak to provide “any proposals for legislation necessary to support such restoration of service.” Amtrak does not believe that additional authorizing legislation is required to ensure that Amtrak can restore service, given Amtrak’s existing rights of access to tracks and rail facilities under the Rail Passenger Service Act. However, if policymakers decide that Amtrak should implement one of the three service restoration options, legislative action will be required to provide funding, above current PRIIA-authorized levels, for ADA and other capital/mobilization costs and ongoing operating losses associated with the option that is chosen.

In light of these conclusions, Amtrak recommends that Congress determine if passenger rail service should be restored between New Orleans and Orlando; and, if so;

1. Identify its preferred option for service restoration; and
2. Provide the additional funding for capital and ongoing operating costs that will be required to implement that option.

Once these steps are taken, Amtrak will move quickly to initiate the actions required for service restoration.

XII. EXHIBITS

- A. Summary of Options Revenue and Cost Estimates
- B. Station Condition, Capital and Operating Cost
- C. Estimated Months to Implementation
- D. Amtrak to CSX letter March 11, 2009
- E. Amtrak to NS letter March 11, 2009
- F. Group I Outreach Letter
- G. Group II Outreach Letter
- H. Group III Outreach Letter
- I. Group IV Outreach Letter
- J. Group I Contact List
- K. Group II Contact List
- L. Group III Contact List
- M. Outreach Letter to Labor Organizations
- N. Labor Organizations Contact List
- O. Median Household Income by County
- P. Population on Proposed Route
- Q. Metropolitan Area Employment for Proposed Route

Exhibit A

Summary of Options Revenue and Cost Estimates

Summary of Scenarios for Gulf Coast Service Report			
PRIIA Study			
<i>Revenue and Cost Estimates</i>			
Description	Option 1	Option 2	Option 3
	Extend Sunset LAX-ORL	Extend City of New Orleans CHI-ORL	Stand Alone NOL-ORL
Days of Service per week	3	7	7
Sleepers (y/n)	Y	Y	Y
Total Riders	53,300	96,100	79,900
Rank - Total Riders	3	1	2
Total Revenue	\$ 6,000,000	\$ 9,200,000	\$ 5,600,000
Rank - Total Revenue	2	1	3
Expenses			
Host Railroad	\$ 900,000	\$ 2,000,000	\$ 2,000,000
Fuel	\$ 1,500,000	\$ 2,500,000	\$ 2,500,000
T&E Labor	\$ 2,900,000	\$ 5,700,000	\$ 5,700,000
OBS Labor	\$ 300,000	\$ 2,500,000	\$ 2,700,000
Mechanical	\$ 1,400,000	\$ 2,600,000	\$ 5,900,000
Remaining Direct Costs	\$ 3,800,000	\$ 5,600,000	\$ 5,200,000
Total Direct Costs	\$ 10,800,000	\$ 20,900,000	\$ 24,000,000
Rank - Total Direct Costs	1	2	3
Net Impact (Revenue - Direct and Shared Costs)	\$ (4,800,000)	\$ (11,700,000)	\$ (18,400,000)
Rank - Net Impact	1	2	3
Fare Box Recovery	56%	44%	23%
Rank - Far Box Recovery	1	2	3
Cost per Train Mile	\$ 44	\$ 36	\$ 41
Net per Train Mile	\$ (19)	\$ (20)	\$ (32)
One Time Charges ⁽¹⁾			
Qualifying Costs	\$ 1,400,000	\$ 2,300,000	\$ 2,300,000
Station Capital Costs	\$ 10,700,000	\$ 10,700,000	\$ 10,700,000
Mechanical Capital Costs	\$ 600,000	\$ 600,000	\$ 600,000
Equipment Capital Costs		\$24 to \$63 million	\$24 to \$63 million
Positive Train Control	\$ 20,000,000	\$ 20,000,000	\$ 20,000,000

1) Does not include host railroad capital investments, if any.

Exhibit B

Station Condition, Capital and Operating Cost

Amtrak Suspended Service Stations -- Capital Costs and Condition Assessments

Station	State	Overall Condition	ADA Score	SGR* Improvement Costs				ADA Improvement Cost						TOTAL			TOTAL CAPITAL COST	
				Station Construction Costs	Pathway Construction Cost	Platform Construction	SGR TOTAL	PIDS** TOTAL	Host RR Protection***	E-Ticketing	Station Construction Costs	Pathways Construction Costs	Platform Construction Costs	ADA TOTAL	Station Construction	Pathway Construction		Platform Construction
Bay St. Louis	MS	Good	67	\$ 43,932	\$ 14,172	\$ 59,478	\$ 117,582	\$ 165,000	\$ 74,882	\$ 110,000	\$ 9,265	\$ 27,917	\$ 65,325	\$ 452,389	\$ 163,197	\$ 42,089	\$ 364,685	\$ 669,971
Gulfport	MS	Fair	43	\$ -	\$ 26,315	\$ 34,927	\$ 61,242	\$ 165,000	\$ 65,255	\$ 110,000	\$ 31,231	\$ 151,054	\$ 73,831	\$ 596,371	\$ 141,231	\$ 177,369	\$ 339,013	\$ 657,613
Biloxi	MS	Fair	67	\$ 45,181	\$ 16,135	\$ 59,479	\$ 120,795	\$ 165,000	\$ 74,882	\$ 110,000	\$ 9,265	\$ 27,917	\$ 65,325	\$ 452,389	\$ 164,446	\$ 44,052	\$ 364,686	\$ 573,184
Pascagoula	MS	Fair	32	\$ 7,137	\$ 17,453	\$ 61,947	\$ 86,537	\$ 165,000	\$ 80,506	\$ 110,000	\$ 10,245	\$ 30,867	\$ 72,230	\$ 468,848	\$ 127,382	\$ 48,320	\$ 378,683	\$ 555,385
Mobile	AL	Poor	0	\$ 51,546	\$ 121,237	\$ 66,098	\$ 238,881	\$ 165,000	\$ 84,376	\$ 110,000	\$ 10,571	\$ 56,791	\$ 74,528	\$ 501,266	\$ 172,117	\$ 178,028	\$ 390,002	\$ 740,147
Almore	AL	Poor	49	\$ 51,546	\$ 121,237	\$ 66,098	\$ 238,881	\$ 165,000	\$ 84,376	\$ 110,000	\$ 10,571	\$ 56,791	\$ 74,528	\$ 501,266	\$ 172,117	\$ 178,028	\$ 390,002	\$ 740,147
Pensacola	FL	Good	82	\$ 30,467	\$ 5,784	\$ 8,745	\$ 44,996	\$ 165,000	\$ 18,686	\$ 110,000	\$ 34,682	\$ 35,479	\$ 22,399	\$ 386,246	\$ 175,149	\$ 41,263	\$ 214,830	\$ 431,242
Crestview	FL	Fair	60	\$ 48,391	\$ 3,219	\$ 9,346	\$ 60,956	\$ 165,000	\$ 88,067	\$ 110,000	\$ 31,231	\$ 75,579	\$ 137,432	\$ 607,309	\$ 189,622	\$ 78,798	\$ 399,845	\$ 668,265
Chipley	FL	Good	69	\$ 18,177	\$ -	\$ -	\$ 18,177	\$ 165,000	\$ 72,538	\$ 110,000	\$ 33,105	\$ 122,753	\$ 120,897	\$ 624,293	\$ 161,282	\$ 122,753	\$ 358,435	\$ 642,470
Tallahassee	FL	Fair	65	\$ 33,130	\$ -	\$ -	\$ 33,130	\$ 165,000	\$ 111,375	\$ 110,000	\$ 33,730	\$ 43,603	\$ 185,625	\$ 649,333	\$ 176,860	\$ 43,603	\$ 462,000	\$ 682,463
Madison	FL	Good	77	\$ 35,517	\$ 67,927	\$ -	\$ 103,444	\$ 165,000	\$ 71,566	\$ 110,000	\$ 6,246	\$ 19,100	\$ 119,277	\$ 491,189	\$ 151,763	\$ 87,027	\$ 355,843	\$ 594,633
Lake City	FL	Fair	66	\$ 6,865	\$ 3,238	\$ 3,706	\$ 13,809	\$ 165,000	\$ 84,322	\$ 110,000	\$ 31,231	\$ 37,575	\$ 136,831	\$ 564,959	\$ 148,096	\$ 40,813	\$ 389,859	\$ 578,768
Sanford	FL	Poor	0	\$ 687,086	\$ 187,387	\$ 374,774	\$ 1,249,247	\$ 165,000	\$ 449,729	\$ 110,000	\$ 749,549	\$ 124,925	\$ 374,774	\$ 1,973,977	\$ 1,546,635	\$ 312,312	\$ 1,364,277	\$ 3,223,224

* SGR: state of good repair

** PIDS: Passenger Information Display System (an electronic signage board that provides real time train status updates)

*** Flagging precautions taken to prevent workers from being injured by passing freight trains

Amtrak Suspended Service Stations -- Annual Operating Costs

Station	State	Fuel, Power, & Utilities	Facility, Communication & Office	TOTAL OPERATING COST
Atmore	AL	\$ 331	\$ 2,628	\$ 2,959
Bay St. Louis	MS	\$ 252	\$ 2,007	\$ 2,259
Biloxi	MS	\$ 1,044	\$ 8,298	\$ 9,342
Chipley	FL	\$ 2,135	\$ 16,974	\$ 19,109
Crestview	FL	\$ 1,536	\$ 12,213	\$ 13,749
Gulfport	MS	\$ 1,025	\$ 8,145	\$ 9,170
Lake City	FL	\$ 796	\$ 6,327	\$ 7,123
Madison	FL	\$ 452	\$ 3,591	\$ 4,043
Mobile	AL	\$ 1,808	\$ 14,373	\$ 16,181
Pascagoula	MS	\$ 317	\$ 2,520	\$ 2,837
Pensacola	FL	\$ 4,676	\$ 37,170	\$ 41,846
Sanford	FL	\$ 747	\$ 5,940	\$ 6,687
Tallahassee	FL	\$ 3,270	\$ 25,992	\$ 29,262
TOTAL		\$ 18,388	\$ 146,178	\$ 164,566

Exhibit C

Estimated Months to Implementation

Months Following Notice to Proceed				
Option 1	Option 2	Option3	Function/Location	Notes
0	48	48	6-14 rail passenger cars	From design initiation to delivery of new units
26	26	26	Tallahassee, FL	Construct new platform and wheel chair lift enclosure
26	26	26	Sanford, FL	Demolish station and build new facility
6	24	24	Rail infrastructure improvements	Depending on option chosen and subsequent capacity demand modeling results, design and construction of infrastructure could be 24 months
23	23	23	Crestview, FL	Construct new platform, restripe parking area, replace guardrails, lighting
20	20	20	Operating employees	Hire, train and qualify locomotive engineers and train conductors
20	20	20	Mobile, AL	Demolish existing shelter and reconstruct new shelter and platform
20	20	20	Atmore, AL	Demolish existing shelter and reconstruct new shelter and platform
20	20	20	Chipley, FL	Construct new platform and wheel chair lift enclosure
20	20	20	Madison, FL	Construct new platform and wheel chair lift enclosure
17	17	17	Bay St. Louis, MS	Demolish existing shelter and reconstruct new shelter and platform
17	17	17	Gulfport, MS	Demolish existing shelter and reconstruct new shelter and platform, parking and lighting
17	17	17	Biloxi, MS	Demolish existing shelter and reconstruct new shelter and platform
17	17	17	Pascagoula, MS	Demolish platform and install shelter, platform and parking
10	10	10	Pensacola, FL	Signage and general repairs
9	9	9	Lake City, FL	Add lift enclosure and signage
9	9	9	Mechanical Facility Improvements	Install servicing pit and rehabilitate wye track
4	4	4	Onboard Service employees	Hire, train and qualify on-board service employees
3	3	3	Station employees	Hire, train and qualify station employees

Exhibit D

Amtrak to CSX letter March 11, 2009

NATIONAL RAILROAD PASSENGER CORPORATION
60 Massachusetts Avenue, NE, Washington, DC 20002



March 2009

Mr. John M. Gibson
NRPC Operations Officer
CSX Transportation, Inc.
500 Water Street, S/C J-315
Jacksonville, FL 32202

Dear Mr. Gibson:

As you may be aware, Section 226 of the Passenger Rail Investment and Improvement Act specifies the following:

Within 9 months after the date of enactment of this Act, Amtrak shall transmit to the Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure of the House of Representatives and the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation of the Senate a plan for restoring passenger rail service between New Orleans, Louisiana, and Sanford, Florida. The plan shall include a projected timeline for restoring such service, the costs associated with restoring such service, and any proposals for legislation necessary to support such restoration of service. In developing the plan, Amtrak shall consult with representatives from the States of Louisiana, Alabama, Mississippi, and Florida, railroad carriers whose tracks may be used for such service, rail passengers, rail labor, and other entities as appropriate.

To fulfill this requirement of the Act, Amtrak has begun a study of several possible service scenarios in this corridor. The study may include, among other factors: discussions with the host railroads as to schedule and operational issues to gain an understanding of current operations; an inspection of the route; development of a ridership/revenue forecast; development of any estimated startup costs; and computation of operating expenses.

I will be in touch with you in the near future to discuss next steps.

Sincerely,



Jason Maga
Senior Officer – Host Railroad Policy

Exhibit E

Amtrak to NS letter March 11, 2009

NATIONAL RAILROAD PASSENGER CORPORATION

60 Massachusetts Avenue, NE, Washington, DC 20002



March 11, 2009

Mr. Mark M. Owens
NRPC Operations Officer
Norfolk Southern Corporation
Amtrak Operations Box 158
1200 Peachtree Street, NE
Atlanta, GA 30309

Dear Mr. Owens:

As you may be aware, Section 226 of the Passenger Rail Investment and Improvement Act specifies the following:

Within 9 months after the date of enactment of this Act, Amtrak shall transmit to the Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure of the House of Representatives and the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation of the Senate a plan for restoring passenger rail service between New Orleans, Louisiana, and Sanford, Florida. The plan shall include a projected timeline for restoring such service, the costs associated with restoring such service, and any proposals for legislation necessary to support such restoration of service. In developing the plan, Amtrak shall consult with representatives from the States of Louisiana, Alabama, Mississippi, and Florida, railroad carriers whose tracks may be used for such service, rail passengers, rail labor, and other entities as appropriate.

To fulfill this requirement of the Act, Amtrak has begun a study of several possible service scenarios in this corridor. The study may include, among other factors: discussions with the host railroads as to schedule and operational issues to gain an understanding of current operations; an inspection of the route; development of a ridership/revenue forecast; development of any estimated startup costs; and computation of operating expenses.

I will be in touch with you in the near future to discuss next steps.

Sincerely,



Jason Maga
Senior Officer – Host Railroad Policy

Exhibit F

Group I Outreach Letter

APRIL 27, 2009

Honorable Howard Shell
Mayor
City of Atmore
201 East Louisville Avenue
Atmore, Alabama 36502

Dear Mayor Shell:

As you may be aware, the Passenger Rail Investment and Improvement Act of 2008 (PRIIA, Public Law 110-432) requires Amtrak to deliver to Congress a plan for restoring rail passenger service between New Orleans, Louisiana, and Sanford, Florida:

Division B, Section 226: Within 9 months after the date of enactment of this Act, Amtrak shall transmit to the Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure of the House of Representatives and the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation of the Senate a plan for restoring passenger rail service between New Orleans, Louisiana, and Sanford, Florida. The plan shall include a projected timeline for restoring such service, the costs associated with restoring such service, and any proposals for legislation necessary to support such restoration of service. In developing the plan, Amtrak shall consult with representatives from the States of Louisiana, Alabama, Mississippi, and Florida, railroad carriers whose tracks may be used for such service, rail passengers, rail labor, and other entities as appropriate.

Accordingly, Amtrak assembled a team to meet this objective. The group examined multiple service and schedule scenarios and has narrowed the list to three. The list includes the former tri-weekly *Sunset Limited* as it operated prior to Hurricane Katrina. In fulfilling the PRIIA requirement, the group will evaluate what actions and funding will be necessary to return service to the region along this route. Amtrak intends to submit a report to Congress on or before the July 16, 2009, deadline.

I will be contacting your office to see if we can schedule a meeting in the next couple of weeks to brief you on the process and the possible scenarios which are most relevant to providing a successful passenger rail service between New Orleans and Florida, crossing the Gulf Coast.

Sincerely,

Thomas L. Stennis III
Director, Government Affairs-South

Exhibit G

Group II Outreach Letter

APRIL 28, 2009

Ms. Tricia Brunson
President and CEO
Niceville-Valparaiso Chamber of Commerce
1055 East John Sims Parkway
Niceville, FL 32578

Dear Ms. Brunson:

As you may be aware, the Passenger Rail Investment and Improvement Act of 2008 (PRIIA, Public Law 110-432) requires Amtrak to deliver to Congress a plan for restoring rail passenger service between New Orleans, Louisiana, and Sanford, Florida:

Division B, Section 226: Within 9 months after the date of enactment of this Act, Amtrak shall transmit to the Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure of the House of Representatives and the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation of the Senate a plan for restoring passenger rail service between New Orleans, Louisiana, and Sanford, Florida. The plan shall include a projected timeline for restoring such service, the costs associated with restoring such service, and any proposals for legislation necessary to support such restoration of service. In developing the plan, Amtrak shall consult with representatives from the States of Louisiana, Alabama, Mississippi, and Florida, railroad carriers whose tracks may be used for such service, rail passengers, rail labor, and other entities as appropriate.

Accordingly, Amtrak assembled a team to meet this objective. The group examined multiple service and schedule scenarios and has narrowed the list to three. In fulfilling the PRIIA requirement, the group will evaluate what actions and funding will be necessary to return service to the region along this route. The three options that emerged as the best options for a successful operation between New Orleans and Sanford are:

1. Restore the former *Sunset Limited*, similar to our operation before Hurricane Katrina. This would be a tri-weekly operation from Los Angeles to New Orleans, resuming the overnight operation with stops at all of the former stations (once the necessary station repairs are complete), terminating in Orlando, Florida.
2. Extend the *City of New Orleans* on a daily schedule beyond the traditional Chicago to New Orleans route, onto Orlando, Florida over the same route as the former *Sunset Limited*. Upon arrival into New Orleans in mid-

afternoon, the train would layover for a late afternoon departure from New Orleans daily, arriving in Orlando the following day in the early afternoon. The return train would depart Orlando late in the afternoon, arriving into New Orleans the following day late in the morning. After a layover in New Orleans the train would depart New Orleans for Chicago in the early afternoon.

3. A stand-alone service would operate daily between New Orleans and Orlando with connections to additional services in New Orleans and Jacksonville. Due to the time required to operate over the host railroads, this train would also be an overnight service between the endpoints. The schedule would be similar to that of the *City of New Orleans* run through scenario; departing New Orleans at late in the afternoon, arriving into Orlando at midday. The return trip would depart Orlando late in the afternoon and arrive back into New Orleans the following morning.

Amtrak intends to submit a report to Congress based on these three scenarios on or before the July 16, 2009, deadline. I hope this information is helpful in your evaluation of the possibilities for restoring service east of New Orleans.

Sincerely,

Thomas L. Stennis III
Director, Government Affairs-South

Exhibit H

Group III Outreach Letter

APRIL 29, 2009

Dear Passenger Rail Advocate:

As you may be aware, the Passenger Rail Investment and Improvement Act of 2008 (PRIIA, Public Law 110-432) requires Amtrak to deliver to Congress a plan for restoring rail passenger service between New Orleans, Louisiana, and Sanford, Florida:

Division B, Section 226: Within 9 months after the date of enactment of this Act, Amtrak shall transmit to the Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure of the House of Representatives and the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation of the Senate a plan for restoring passenger rail service between New Orleans, Louisiana, and Sanford, Florida. The plan shall include a projected timeline for restoring such service, the costs associated with restoring such service, and any proposals for legislation necessary to support such restoration of service. In developing the plan, Amtrak shall consult with representatives from the States of Louisiana, Alabama, Mississippi, and Florida, railroad carriers whose tracks may be used for such service, rail passengers, rail labor, and other entities as appropriate.

Accordingly, Amtrak assembled a team to meet this objective. The group examined multiple service and schedule scenarios and has narrowed the list to three that were the most operationally feasible. These include the former *Sunset Limited* as it operated prior to Hurricane Katrina; operating the *City of New Orleans* through from Chicago, via New Orleans, on a daily basis to Orlando; and a stand-alone service operating daily on an overnight schedule between New Orleans and Orlando with connections in New Orleans and Jacksonville.

Amtrak intends to submit a report to Congress based on these three scenarios and the costs associated with them on or before the July 16, 2009, deadline. I hope this information is helpful in your evaluation of the possibilities for restoring service east of New Orleans.

Sincerely,

Thomas L. Stennis III
Director, Government Affairs-South

Exhibit I

Group IV Outreach Letter

APRIL 23, 2009

«Title» «First_Name» «Last_Name»

«Salutation»

«Company_Name»

«Address_Line_1»

«Address_Line_2»

«City», «State» «ZIP_Code»

Dear «Salutation» «Last_Name»:

The Passenger Rail Investment and Improvement Act of 2008 (PRIIA, Public Law 110-432) requires Amtrak to deliver to Congress a plan for restoring rail passenger service between New Orleans, Louisiana, and Sanford, Florida:

Division B, Section 226: Within 9 months after the date of enactment of this Act, Amtrak shall transmit to the Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure of the House of Representatives and the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation of the Senate a plan for restoring passenger rail service between New Orleans, Louisiana, and Sanford, Florida. The plan shall include a projected timeline for restoring such service, the costs associated with restoring such service, and any proposals for legislation necessary to support such restoration of service. In developing the plan, Amtrak shall consult with representatives from the States of Louisiana, Alabama, Mississippi, and Florida, railroad carriers whose tracks may be used for such service, rail passengers, rail labor, and other entities as appropriate.

Accordingly, Amtrak assembled a team to meet this objective. The group examined multiple service and schedule scenarios, narrowing the list of scenarios to three. In fulfilling the PRIIA requirement, the group will evaluate what actions will be necessary to return service to the region along this route. The three options that emerged as the best options for a feasible operation between New Orleans and Sanford are:

1. Restore the former *Sunset Limited*, similar to our operation before Hurricane Katrina. This would be a tri-weekly operation from Los Angeles to New Orleans, resuming the overnight operation with stops at all of the former stations (once the necessary station repairs are complete), terminating in Orlando, Florida.

2. Extend the *City of New Orleans* on a daily schedule beyond the traditional Chicago to New Orleans route, onto Orlando, Florida over the same route as the former *Sunset Limited*. Upon arrival into New Orleans in mid-afternoon, the train would layover for a late afternoon departure from New Orleans daily, arriving in Orlando the following day in the early afternoon. The return train would depart Orlando late in the afternoon, arriving into New Orleans the following day late in the morning. After a layover in New Orleans the train would depart New Orleans for Chicago in the early afternoon.
3. A stand-alone service would operate daily between New Orleans and Orlando with connections to additional services in New Orleans and Jacksonville. Due to the time required to operate over the host railroads, this train would also be an overnight service between the endpoints. The schedule would be similar to that of the *City of New Orleans* run through scenario; departing New Orleans at late in the afternoon, arriving into Orlando at midday. The return trip would depart Orlando late in the afternoon and arrive back into New Orleans the following morning.

Amtrak is reaching out to a range of stakeholders outlining the information shown above, and we will consider comments we receive during this process.

Under each of the above scenarios, equipment type and availability will be evaluated further. PRIIA also requires that we study two other long-distance routes that also will need equipment. Amtrak's long-distance equipment fleet is stretched by current operations.

We also have notified the host railroads and affected labor organizations that we are performing these analyses and we will meet with them soon. We have been informed that the Positive Train Control requirements in Division A, Section 104 of PRIIA is a consideration for this report, but will not keep us from completing it. Like every other Amtrak route, a plan for Positive Train Control implementation by 2015 will be needed.

Finally, there are two areas that will be significant factors in determining a timeline for starting up any of the service scenarios. These areas are station condition, including ADA compliance needs and rebuilding stations with significant hurricane damage, and crew training and deployment.

Amtrak intends to submit a report to Congress based on these three scenarios on or before the July 16, 2009, deadline. It will include projected ridership, revenues, and overall costs for this service. We are willing to offer briefings to our Congressional stakeholders and will be reaching out to you in coming weeks to see if you would like to be included.

Sincerely,

Joe McHugh
Vice President
Government Affairs and Corporate Communications

Exhibit J

Group I Contact List

Last Name	First Name	Title	Agency
Apgar	Robert	Mayor	City of Deland
Atkinson	Col. Tom	Deputy Assistant Secretary, Intermodal Transportation Division	Louisiana Department of Transportation & Development
Avara	Matthew	Mayor	City of Pascagoula
Bonner	Jo	Congressman	State of Alabama, 1st Congressional District
Boyd	Allen	Congressman	State of Florida, 2nd Congressional District
Bradley	Ken	Mayor	City of Winter Park
Brown	Corrine	Congresswoman	State of Florida, 3rd Congressional District
Cadle	David	Mayor	City of Crestview
Cain	Linda	Mayor	City of Chipley
Capon	Ross	President	National Association of Railroad Passengers
Cochran	Thad	Senator	State of Mississippi, United States Senate
Crenshaw	Ander	Congressman	State of Florida, 4th Congressional District
Dyer	Buddy	Mayor	City of Orlando
Edwards	Steven K.	Intermodal Planning Director	Mississippi Department of Transportation
Favre	Eddie	Mayor	City of Bay St. Louis
Flagg	Karl	Mayor	City of Palatka
Gibson	John	NRPC Operations Officer	CSX Transportation, Inc.
Grayson	Alan	Congressman	State of Florida, 8th Congressional District
Haddad	Nazih	Manager, Pass. Rail Development	Florida Department of Transportation
Holloway	A.J.	Mayor	City of Biloxi
Jilla	Robert J.	Multi-modal Senior Administrator	Alabama Department of Transportation
Jones	Sam	Mayor	City of Mobile
Kuhn	Linda	Mayor	City of Sanford
Landrieu	Mary	Senator	State of Louisiana, United States Senate
Marks	John	Mayor	City of Tallahassee

Last Name	First Name	Title	Agency
Martinez	Mel	Senator	State of Florida, United States Senate
Mica	John	Congressman	State of Florida, 7th Congressional District
Miller	Jeff	Congressman	State of Florida, 1st Congressional District
Nagin	Ray	Mayor	City of New Orleans
Nelson	Bill	Senator	State of Florida, United States Senate
Owens	Mark	NRPC Operations Officer	Norfolk Southern Corporation
Parsons	Karen	Executive Director	Southern High-Speed Rail Commission
Peyton	John	Mayor	City of Jacksonville
Quang	Joseph	Congressman	State of Louisiana, 2nd Congressional District
Sessions	Jeff	Senator	State of Alabama, United States Senate
Shelby	Richard	Senator	State of Alabama, United States Senate
Shell	Howard	Mayor	City of Atmore
Stearns	Clifford	Congressman	State of Florida, 6th Congressional District
Taylor	Gene	Congressman	State of Mississippi, 4th Congressional District
Sita	John	Director	Sunset Marketing and Revitalization Team
Valentine	Myra	Mayor	City of Madison
Vitter	David	Senator	State of Louisiana, United States Senate
Warr	Brent	Mayor	City of Gulfport
Wicker	Roger	Senator	State of Mississippi, United States Senate
Wiggins	Mike	Mayor	City of Pensacola
Wilkinson	Elaine G.	Executive Director	Gulf Regional Planning Commission
Witt	Stephen M.	Mayor	City of Lake City
Kenny	Mark B.	General Chairman,	BLET
Suozzo	Albert L.	General Chairman,	UTU
Jones	Lawrence J.	International Representative,	TCU
Vollten	Larry	General Chairman and President,	ARASA-OBS
Harris	Roger	Vice Chairman,	ASWC

Last Name	First Name	Title	Agency
Weber	William F.	Acting General Chairman	UTU-Stewards
Rodzicz	Edward W.	International President,	BLET-Carbon Copy
Tolman	John	Vice President and National Legislative Representative	BLET-Carbon Copy
Scardelletti	Robert A.	International President,	TCU-Carbon Copy
Kloos	Ron	Legislative Representative,	TCU-Carbon Copy
Futhey, Jr.	M.B.	International President,	UTU-Carbon Copy
Stem, Jr.	James	National Legislative Director,	UTU-Carbon Copy
Wilhelm	John W.	International President,	ASWC-Carbon Copy
Juliano	Robert E.	Legislative Representative,	ASWC-Carbon Copy

Exhibit K

Group II Contact List

Last Name	First Name	Agency
Arnold	Paula	President, Madison County Chamber
Brunson	Tricia	President-CEO Niceville-Valparaiso Chamber
Carpenter	C. Harold	Mayor, City of DeFuniak Springs
Kelley	Walter T.	Bay County Transportation Planning Organization
Kelly	Mortimore	President, Louisiana Association of Railroad Passengers
McQuigg	Jackson	Florida Coalition of Rail Pass.
Nocera	Bud	Visit Florida

Exhibit L

Group III Contact List

Last Name	First Name
Anderson	Dolores T.
Baldwin	Earlyn
Baumann	Walter
Beckham	Daniel A.
Bonnin	Stu
Bryant	Lucille
Campbell	Mary Anne
Commer	Jake B.
Crumlish	Col. William S.
Curry	Dolores
Dash	Howard J.
Fetherolf	Karen
Freedman	Joseph
Gray	Patrick
Hadley	C. Jay
Harrison	Madelaine
Hicks	Martha
Johanssen	Dr. Calvin M.
Kline	Todd A
Kotas	Ronald
Kress	Elizabeth
Kwong	Benson
Mays	Robert W.
McGill	James D.
Morrison	Eddie

Last Name	First Name
Nelson	Donna S.
Oliveri	Stephen
Parker	Tom
Perkins	Delores A.
Perkins	Joyce A.
Phernetton	Ronald A.
Pittman	Lloyd
Reiser	Thomas J.
Riley	James E.
Roberts	Marylyn
Salisbury	Anne E.
Shirley	Fred E.
Smith	James
Stacy	Robert
Stokes	L.C.
Sullivan	Jerry H.
Summers	Paul E.
Yelton	Richard
York	Lawson

Exhibit M

Outreach Letter to Labor Organizations

April 8, 2009

Mr. Mark B. Kenny
General Chairman, BLET
Highway 34, Mail Box 11
Wall, NJ 07719

Mr. Larry Vollten
General Chairman and President, 1985
ARASA-OBS
8100 Singing Woods
Spotsylvania, VA 22553

Mr. Albert L. Suozzo
General Chairperson, UTU
1515 Market Street, Suite 708
Philadelphia, PA 19102

Mr. Roger Harris
Vice Chairman, ASWC
1130 S. Wabash Ave., Suite 201
Chicago, IL 60605

Mr. Lawrence J. Jones
International Representative, TCU
309 "A" Street
Wilmington, DE 19801

Mr. William F. Weber
Acting General Chairman,
UTU-Stewards
441 74th Street
Brooklyn, NY 11209

Gentlemen: The Passenger Rail Investment and Improvement Act (PRIIA) of October 16, 2008 included provisions for Amtrak to transmit to the appropriate House and Senate Committees a plan for the restoration of passenger rail service between New Orleans, LA and Sanford, FL. One requirement of the act in this regard was for Amtrak to consult with a number of parties, including rail labor, as appropriate.

Attached to this letter are three (3) viable options for the restoration of such service being considered which are summarized as follows:

1. Restoration of the former "*Sunset Limited*"; Tri-weekly Sleeper Service (See Attachment No. 1)
2. Extension of the "City of New Orleans" to Orlando, FL; Daily Sleeper Service (See Attachment No. 2)

3. New Stand-alone Service between New Orleans and Orlando, FL; Daily Sleeper Service (*See Attachment No. 3*)

We are soliciting your initial views and input on these options. Please forward your comments to the undersigned at 30th Street Station, 2nd Floor-South, Box 32, Philadelphia, PA 19104 by May 1, 2009, and I will forward them to the PRIIA Team for consideration.

Very truly yours,

Larry C. Hriczak
Director - Labor Relations

Attachments (3)

cc: Edward W. Rodzwick, International President, BLET
John Tolman, VP & National Legislative Rep., BLET
Robert A. Scardelletti, International President, TCU
Ron Kloos, Legislative Representative, TCU
M. B. Futhey, Jr., International President, UTU
James Stem, Jr., National Legislative Director, UTU
John W. Wilhelm, International President, ASWC
Robert E. Juliano, Legislative Rep., ASWC
Joseph M. Bress, Vice President - Labor Relations
William Crosbie, Chief Operating Officer

Exhibit N

Labor Organizations Contact List

UNION	GENERAL CHAIRMAN	VICE PRESIDENT	VARIOUS REPRESENTATIVES	PRESIDENT
BLE Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers	Mark B. Kenny General Chairman AMTRAK/MBCR/Connex General Committee of Adjustment IBT Rail Conference 1985 Highway 34, Suite A7A-1, Mailbox 11 Wall, NJ OFFICE: (732) 275-8206 FAX: (732) 275-8188 EMAIL: mbk11@comcast.net		John Tolman VP & National Legislative Rep. 25 Louisiana Avenue, NW Washington, DC 20001 OFFICE: (202) 624-8776 FAX: (202) 624-3086 EMAIL: tolman@ble-t.org	Edward W. Rodzicz International President 1370 Ontario Ave. Mezzanine-Standard Bldg. Cleveland, OH 44113-1702 OFFICE: (216) 241-2630 x260 FAX: (216) 241-6516 EMAIL: Edrodz@ble-t.org
TCU Transportation Communication International Union Clerks	Lawrence J. Jones International Representative 309 A Street Wilmington, DE 19801 OFFICE: (302) 498-0959 x18 FAX: (302) 498-0969 EMAIL: Jonesl@tcunion.org Kevin J. O'Connell Assistant International Rep. 309 A Street Wilmington, DE 19801 OFFICE: (302) 498-0959	Joel M. Parker Int'l Vice President 3 Research Place Rockville, MD 20850 OFF: (301) 840-8728 FAX: (301) 330-7672 EMAIL: parkerj@tcunion.org Russell C. Oathout Int'l Vice President 3 Research Place Rockville, MD 20850 OFF: (301) 840-8752 FAX: (301) 330-7662 EMAIL: outhour@tcunion.org	Daniel Biggs International-Secretary-Treasurer 3 Research Place Rockville, MD 20850 OFF: (301) 840-8749 FAX: (301) 330-7665 EMAIL: biggsd@tcunion.org Ron Kloos Legislative Representative 3 Research Place Rockville, MD 20850 OFF: (301) 948-4910 FAX: (301) 948-1369 EMAIL: Kloosr@tcunion.org EMAIL:	Robert A. Scardelletti International President 3 Research Place Rockville, MD 20850 OFF: (301) 948-4910 FAX: (301) 948-1369

UNION	GENERAL CHAIRMAN	VICE PRESIDENT	VARIOUS REPRESENTATIVES	PRESIDENT
ARASA OBS The American Railway and Airway Supervisors Association, On Board Service	Larry Vollten General Chairman and President 8100 Singing Woods Spotsylvania, VA 22553 CELL: (856) 625-8686 EMAIL: Lovo1@earthlink.net			

Exhibit O

Median Household Income by County

Median Household Income for Study Area			
Station	State	County	Median Income
New Orleans	LA	Orleans	\$37,348
Bay St. Louis	MS	Hancock	\$38,192
Gulfport	MS	Harrison	\$40,803
Biloxi	MS	Harrison	\$40,804
Pascagoula	MS	Jackson	\$43,411
Mobile	AL	Mobile	\$37,575
Atmore	AL	Escambia	\$34,615
Pensacola	FL	Escambia	\$41,772
Crestview	FL	Okaloosa	\$54,633
Chipley	FL	Washington	\$34,535
Tallahassee	FL	Leon	\$48,739
Madison	FL	Madison	\$39,394
Lake City	FL	Columbia	\$40,422
Jacksonville	FL	Duval	\$49,175
Palatka	FL	Putnam	\$33,282
Deland	FL	Volusia	\$42,268
Sanford	FL	Seminole	\$56,315
Winter Park	FL	Orange	\$50,988
Orlando	FL	Orange	\$50,989
USA			\$50,740

Note: Compiled by Amtrak from 2007 Census Bureau data.

Exhibit P

Population on Proposed Route

Station	County	2000	2007	2008	Percent Change	
					08 / 00	08 / 07
Population: Proposed Sunset East Route						
Atmore, Alabama	Escambia County	38,440	37,557	37,490	-2.5%	-0.2%
Mobile (Amtrak), Alabama	Mobile County	399,843	404,097	406,309	1.6%	0.5%
New Orleans, Louisiana	Orleans Parish	484,674	288,113	311,853	-35.7%	8.2%
Bay St. Louis, Mississippi	Hancock County	42,969	39,741	40,140	-6.6%	1.0%
Biloxi, Mississippi	Harrison County	189,606	176,366	178,460	-5.9%	1.2%
Gulfport, Mississippi	Harrison County					
Pascagoula, Mississippi	Jackson County	131,420	130,201	130,694	-0.6%	0.4%
<i>Subtotal Central Gulf Coast</i>		<u>1,286,952</u>	<u>1,076,075</u>	<u>1,104,946</u>	-14.1%	2.7%
Pensacola, Florida	Escambia County	294,410	303,657	302,939	2.9%	-0.2%
Tallahassee, Florida	Leon County	239,454	262,141	264,063	10.3%	0.7%
Madison, Florida	Madison County	18,733	18,912	18,895	0.9%	-0.1%
Crestview, Florida	Okaloosa County	170,497	181,087	179,693	5.4%	-0.8%
Chipley, Florida	Washington County	20,973	22,843	23,928	14.1%	4.7%
<i>Subtotal Florida Panhandle</i>		<u>744,067</u>	<u>788,640</u>	<u>789,518</u>	6.1%	0.1%
Lake City, Florida	Columbia County	56,510	67,868	69,092	22.3%	1.8%
Jacksonville, Florida	Duval County	778,866	846,964	850,962	9.3%	0.5%
Orlando	Orange County	896,346	1,063,979	1,072,801	19.7%	0.8%
Winter Park	Orange County					
Palatka, Florida	Putnam County	70,423	73,658	73,459	4.3%	-0.3%
Sanford (Auto Train), Florida	Seminole County	365,199	408,561	410,854	12.5%	0.6%
Deland, Florida	Volusia County	443,341	499,734	498,036	12.3%	-0.3%
<i>Subtotal North Florida</i>		<u>2,610,685</u>	<u>2,960,764</u>	<u>2,975,204</u>	14.0%	0.5%
Total		<u>4,641,704</u>	<u>4,825,479</u>	<u>4,869,668</u>	4.9%	0.9%

Note: Compiled by Amtrak from Census Bureau data.

Exhibit Q

Metropolitan Area Employment for Proposed Route

Metropolitan Area Employment: Proposed Sunset East Route				
	2006	2007	% of Total	% Change 6-Jul
Private Non-Farm Employment				
Forestry, fishing, related activities, and other	3,303	3,600	0.1%	9.0%
Mining	12,189	12,688	0.3%	4.1%
Utilities	8,492	8,134	0.2%	-4.2%
Construction	327,845	325,122	7.9%	-0.8%
Manufacturing	183,798	185,224	4.5%	0.8%
Wholesale trade	138,845	144,620	3.5%	4.2%
Retail trade	448,659	457,556	11.1%	2.0%
Transportation and warehousing	127,502	133,111	3.2%	4.4%
Information	75,691	73,507	1.8%	-2.9%
Finance and insurance	181,052	184,604	4.5%	2.0%
Real estate and rental and leasing	198,694	212,642	5.2%	7.0%
Professional, scientific, and technical services	254,072	254,768	6.2%	0.3%
Management of companies and enterprises	31,594	32,533	0.8%	3.0%
Administrative and waste services	311,002	325,339	7.9%	4.6%
Educational services	68,892	70,688	1.7%	2.6%
Health care and social assistance	349,857	364,780	8.8%	4.3%
Arts, entertainment, and recreation	123,062	133,363	3.2%	8.4%
Accommodation and food services	347,803	362,897	8.8%	4.3%
Other services, except public administration	222,850	227,573	5.5%	2.1%
Other Private	40,367	45,907	1.1%	2.1%
Government and government enterprises	535,602	544,593	13.2%	1.7%
Farm employment	20,774	20,101	0.5%	-3.2%
Total	4,011,945	4,123,350	100.0%	2.8%

Source: Amtrak summary of data published by the Bureau of Transportation Statistics for the following metropolitan statistics areas served by the proposed Sunset East Route

- New Orleans-Metairie-Kenner, LA
- Mobile, AL
- Gulfport-Biloxi, MS
- Pascagoula, MS
- Tallahassee, FL
- Fort Walton Beach-Crestview-Destin, FL
- Pensacola-Ferry Pass-Brent, FL
- Jacksonville, FL
- Deltona-Daytona Beach-Ormond Beach, FL
- Orlando, FL